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Executive Summary 
UN peacekeepers withdrew from Timor-Leste in December 2012, ending a thirteen-
year presence after two successful elections underscored the country’s continued 
stability. Pragmatic decisions by local leaders after the 2006 crisis to use swelling 
petroleum industry revenues to buy peace have paid dividends. But that strategy 
rests on three anchors: the authority of the current prime minister; the deferral of 
institutional reforms in the security sector; and the flow of oil and gas revenues from 
the Timor Sea. The dependence on the petroleum industry is unsustainable, and the 
need to develop alternative anchors may be more urgent than it appears. 
Timor-Leste has recovered well from the 2006 crisis, when tensions spilled onto 
the streets as police, army and disaffected veterans fought one another, and over 
100,000 Dili residents were displaced. Oil and gas revenues have helped provide the 
cure. The Petroleum Fund began to swell after production from the Timor Sea began 
in 2004 and now stands at $11.7 billion. The money gave the Aliança da Maioria Par-
lamentar (AMP) government headed by Xanana Gusmão the confidence and the re-
sources to spend its way out of conflict. It gave rewards to the surrendering “petition-
ers”, whose desertions from the army had set the crisis in motion; offered cash grants 
to persuade the displaced to return; funded lavish pensions for disgruntled veterans; 
and put potential spoilers to work pursuant to lucrative construction contracts. 
The 2012 elections bore testament to greater political stability but placed power 
in the hands of a few. Gusmão’s party returned with a broader mandate and stream-
lined coalition; his former guerrilla army subordinate (and recent armed forces 
chief), Taur Matan Ruak, became president. Both mobilised the structures of the 
resistance to aid their elections, while business interests also played a large role in 
the parliamentary poll. Though he formed a 55-member cabinet, Gusmão has been 
reluctant to delegate political authority to potential successors, instead centralising 
power under himself and a few key ministers. All political parties face internal prob-
lems, and the question of who will succeed such a dominant figure remains. Ruak is 
one possibility – he has been a vocal government critic, providing some accountabil-
ity not offered by a weak parliament. But there are few other obvious successors, and 
the transition could be messy. 
Overly centralised political power sharpens risks from the dual lack of effective 
oversight and of adequate institutional arrangements in the security sector. Gusmão, 
who reappointed himself joint security and defence minister, has used his personal 
authority to tamp down tensions among and between the various security forces 
rather than make long-term policy. The police are without clear leadership and hob-
bled by inadequate investigative skills and discipline problems. Proposals to establish 
a separate criminal investigation service to address the poor track record of prosecu-
tions may only weaken the force as a whole. The military has become more profes-
sional, but as it doubles in size and deploys across the country, the reluctance to out-
line a clear division of labour between the security forces poses greater risks. That 
task will not be made easier by the anomaly that though the country faces almost no 
external threats, the army’s ambitions are expanding. 
The government will also have to work harder to ensure improved and more equi-
table returns on its investments. The Petroleum Fund provides considerable inde-
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pendence from donor-driven priorities and freedom to spend without going into 
debt. The government views spending as an economic stimulus measure and im-
provements to infrastructure as a prerequisite to sustainable growth, but returns 
have been woeful. In recent years, over half the state budget has been devoted to 
construction projects, but actual execution has sometimes seemed an afterthought. 
Limited investment in the weak education and health sectors is not doing enough to 
ensure the welfare of future generations. 
The greatest challenge facing this government will be to make progress in provid-
ing economic opportunities without exhausting national wealth. It will have to prior-
itise the search for more sustainable employment for a rapidly growing workforce, 
driven by one of the world’s highest birth rates. It will also need to find ways to tack-
le the perceived growth in social inequality, as elites largely centred in the capital 
benefit from access to increased spending. It must produce visible results against al-
leged corruption. And in designing major measures, such as land-titling legislation 
and decentralisation, it will need to work with parliament and civil society in order 
to produce legislation and policies that enjoy a greater degree of public legitimacy. 
Timor-Leste deserves praise for the success with which it has implemented prag-
matic policies designed to bring rapid stability following the 2006 crisis. Promoting 
confidence at home and abroad is important for transforming any post-conflict 
economy. But it likely has a very limited window of opportunity during which to 
make investments – both political and financial – that might mitigate the still real 
risks of an eventual return to conflict.  
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Recommendations  
To the Government of Timor-Leste: 
1. Develop a more prudent and sustainable approach to government spending, with 
an eye toward ensuring that investments pay real dividends for future genera-
tions, including by:  
a) developing better quality controls for infrastructure projects; 
b) including provisions in contracts concluded with foreign companies to train 
Timorese workers in new skills; and 
c) capping benefits provided to resistance veterans so as to bring greater balance 
to social protection policies. 
2. Appoint a dedicated defence and security minister with sufficient political au-
thority to strengthen ministry functions and take the following steps: 
a) lead development of a long-term vision for the police and military that includes 
consensus on how to strengthen criminal investigations and on the opera-
tional implications of the army’s territorial deployment, ensuring primacy for 
the police in the maintenance of domestic law and order; and 
b) prioritise improvements in addressing disciplinary infractions involving the 
police and the military. 
3. Formulate a transparent, government-wide policy on process and compensation 
to be applied to those individuals and communities that will be relocated as the 
pace of government-driven development accelerates. 
4. Expand efforts to engage both parliament and civil society in developing consen-
sus on policy proposals grounded in local realities, with an eye toward generat-
ing better legislation that also enjoys popular legitimacy and reducing delays in 
the decision-making process. 
To donors: 
5. Maintain support for domestic civil society, while continuing to support priori-
ties identified by the Timorese government, and help in particular efforts that 
work alongside the government to improve the quality of policy development 
and legislation. 
Dili/Jakarta/Brussels, 8 May 2013
International Crisis Group 
Asia Report N°246  8 May 2013  
Timor-Leste: Stability at What Cost? 
I. The AMP Style of Governance 
Timor-Leste’s peaceful 2012 polls saw the re-election of a coalition government head-
ed by Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão and the subsequent withdrawal of the UN 
thirteen-year-old peacekeeping mission.1 Successful elections were a pre-condition 
for the withdrawal, and many observers saw them as proof that the hard-won political 
stability after the 2006 crisis had been consolidated.2 An atmosphere of cooperation 
between political parties has even strengthened in recent months, but the question 
remains how long it will last. 
The new administration’s authority is based on three factors: the popularity of 
Gusmão, the sharp increase in earnings from the petroleum sector and its willing-
ness to spend them. A streamlined version of the coalition that held office from August 
2007 until August 2012 – the Aliança da Maioria Parlamentar (Parliamentary Ma-
jority Alliance, AMP) – it has publicly committed to continuing the policies that have 
brought the country to where it is today. A look toward the immediate future must 
first examine the success and challenges of the past five years.  
The AMP presided over a four-fold increase in revenue and a five-fold increase in 
the state budget.3 A surge in oil and gas money allowed it to pursue a strategy of buy-
ing peace, and budgeted expenditure ballooned from $348 million to $1.7 billion.4 In 
its boldest move, it used the money to return or resettle more than 30,000 of those 
displaced during the crisis. It bought off spoilers with government contracts, pump-
ing money into the economy in the hope that it would drive future development.  
Oil and gas revenues began to flow in 2004, after production started in the Bayu-
Undan gas field, the first block of the Timor-Leste/Australia Joint Petroleum Devel-
opment Area to be brought on line. The dramatic increase in revenues was one of the 
 
 
1 For previous Crisis Group reporting on Timor-Leste, including detailed description and analysis of 
the 2006 crisis, see Crisis Group Asia Reports N°120, Resolving Timor-Leste’s Crisis, 10 October 
2006; N°143, Timor-Leste: Security Sector Reform, 17 January 2008; N°148, Timor-Leste’s Dis-
placement Crisis, 31 March 2008; and N°180, Handing Back Responsibility to Timor-Leste’s 
Police, 3 December 2009; also, Crisis Group Asia Briefings N°65, Timor-Leste’s Parliamentary 
Elections, 12 June 2007; N°87, No Time for Complacency, 9 February 2009; N°104, Timor-Leste: 
Oecusse and the Indonesian Border, 20 May 2010; N°110, Managing Land Conflict in Timor-
Leste, 9 September 2010; N°116, Timor-Leste: Time for the UN to Step Back, 15 December 2010; 
N°122, Timor-Leste: Reconciliation and Return from Indonesia, 18 April 2011; N°129, Timor-
Leste’s Veterans: An Unfinished Struggle?, 18 November 2011; and N°134, Timor-Leste’s Elections: 
Leaving Behind a Violent Past?, 21 February 2012. 
2 Prior to the 2006 crisis, the number of peacekeepers had fallen to under 100 police advisers and 
civilian staff who comprised the UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), mandated for one year from 
May 2005 and due to withdraw as violence erupted in Dili in April-May.  
3 Figures from “Article IV Consultation Staff Report”, International Monetary Fund (IMF), 13 Jan-
uary 2012. 2012 revenue figures are IMF projections. 
4 Timor-Leste uses the U.S. dollar as its currency. As the NGO La’o Hamutuk pointed out, the 
budgetary expansion is second globally only to Zimbabwe, where it was chiefly a factor of inflation. 
See “Key issues in the 2012 State Budget”, 7 October 2011, available at laohamutuk.blogspot.com/ 
2011/10/key-issues-in-2012-state-budget.html. 
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many drivers of the tensions that marked the 2006 crisis, whose proximate trigger 
was a fractious and politicised security sector but whose roots were diverse. As a 
leader of the Fretilin party – which led government at the time – explained, the cri-
sis “was also a crisis of ideas”.5 The Fretilin administration had seen itself as pursu-
ing long-term, incremental change but then-President Gusmão was impatient for the 
new revenues to provide quicker results. He told an Australian magazine in 2005:  
Right now, we can’t even name our priorities – the donors do. If the donors say 
education is a priority, then we must follow. But … the priority must be to give 
people an income, to reduce poverty. It’s bullshit to say we should spend on edu-
cation alone and become a knowledge country because that will automatically 
make us rich.6 
This impatience was part of the impetus behind the campaign of the new party 
Gusmão created to contest the 2007 elections: the Congresso Nacional para a Recon-
strução de Timor-Leste (National Congress for the Reconstruction of Timor-Leste, 
CNRT). It campaigned with posters showing luxury marinas, hotel developments 
and fighter jets, while promising to increase social spending. It won only eighteen of 
55 seats, but after protracted negotiations was able to woo the Partido Democrático 
(Democratic Party, PD) away from a likely coalition with Fretilin. Then along with 
three smaller parties, CNRT and PD formed the AMP government on 8 August 2007.7 
Its first priority was the return of those displaced following the 2006 crisis. Esti-
mates of their total number exceed 100,000; some 30,000 took up residence in camps 
for internally displaced persons (IDPs) around Dili. For two years, one such camp 
was the first sight greeting visitors arriving at the airport; IDPs could also be seen 
sheltering outside the city’s leading hotel. 
A minimum level of stability was a prerequisite for facilitating the return of the 
displaced, and that meant ending the threat posed by Alfredo Reinado and hundreds 
of disgruntled former soldiers. Reinado was a former military police officer who had 
deserted at the height of the crisis and joined with the “petitioners” who had desert-
ed the army in February over poor conditions.8 He roamed the mountains for nearly 
two years, evading arrest and challenging the government’s credibility. On 11 Febru-
ary 2008, he came to President Ramos-Horta’s residence with a group of some twen-
ty under disputed circumstances, allegedly with the intention of killing the president. 
In the shoot-out that followed, the president was wounded and Reinado killed. 
The shooting of the president and a near-simultaneous foiled attack on the prime 
minister presented the gravest threat to national security since the crisis. The re-
sponse by UN police (then responsible for security was seen as clumsy; it took them 
an hour and a half to arrive at the scene of the shooting. The government responded 
in the following days by rapidly mobilising a joint army-police command. While it 
blurred the lines of responsibility for internal security, the new command also sent a 
 
 
5 Crisis Group interview, Arsenio Bano, Fretilin vice president, Dili, 5 September 2012. 
6 Tony Clifton, “Fields of Dreams”, The Monthly, July 2005. 
7 The AMP government consisted of CNRT (eighteen seats), the Social-Democrat Party (PSD) and 
the Social-Democrat Association of Timor party (ASDT) (who together formed an eleven-seat bloc), 
PD (eight seats) and the National Democratic Union of the Timorese Resistance (UNDERTIM, two 
seats). 
8 For more on the petitioners, see Crisis Group Report, Resolving Timor-Leste’s Crisis, op. cit.  
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reassuring message of national unity and is credited with contributing to an esprit de 
corps among the security forces that helped paper over earlier tensions. 
Reinado’s death eliminated the immediate security threat, but resolving broader 
threats to stability required a different approach. The AMP government embarked 
on a strategy of buying the peace through three principal avenues: i) a retirement 
payout for the petitioners, along with two headline benefit programs for helping the 
displaced in Dili and recognising veterans of the independence struggle; ii) introduc-
ing social-protection schemes and expanding civil service; and iii) concluding major 
infrastructure contracts with potential spoilers. All these measures have dramatically 
increased the outflow of government money, including beyond the capital; each 
entails its own political and economic risks for the future.  
The first goal was to restore a sense of normalcy by dealing with the remaining 
petitioners and returning the displaced. Coercive pressure was applied to Reinado’s 
followers through the joint army-police command at the same time that cash rewards 
were offered for their surrender.9 These payments were the first example of the AMP 
buying peace: each petitioner was eligible to receive $8,000 – 70 times the monthly 
minimum civil service wage.10 The recovery strategy for the displaced received new 
impetus once the petitioners had surrendered, and people felt safer to return home. 
Between 2008 and the end of 2010, the government closed all the IDP camps and 
spent $56.8 million in recovery grants. Most of this was in the form of family grants 
of $4,500 for those who could produce evidence of their home’s destruction.11 
These two one-time cash-grant programs increased the pressure building on the 
government to implement a much broader benefits program: pensions for the com-
batentes de libertação nacional, the veterans of the 24-year resistance struggle. The 
veterans wanted their own piece of the rapidly expanding pie, and pressure to reward 
them was also fuelled by inclusion in the AMP government of several leading figures 
who had supported integration with Indonesia before the 1999 referendum. Payments 
began in April 2008 to a small number and expanded to over $100 million in the 
2012 budget; some 76,000 have received payments to date.12 The program came un-
der significant political pressure from veterans to be expanded further; changes in 
2009 expanded the number eligible and opened a new period during which a further 
125,000 registered.13 
 
 
9 The joint command operation was criticised by some, including the UN mission, as overly aggres-
sive. An observer wrote of allegations “includ[ing] ill-treatment of civilians, pointing of weapons 
and death threats, in addition to failure to comply with legal procedures when carrying out arrests 
and home searches”. Bu V.E. Wilson, “The exception becomes the norm in Timor-Leste: the draft 
national security laws and the continuing role of the Joint Command”, Center for International 
Governance and Justice Issues Paper no. 11, September 2009. 
10 See “Integração dos ex-militares na vida civil” [“Integration of ex-soldiers into civilian life”], De-
cree 12/2008, 11 June 2008. The benefit was equal to three years of back pay plus $1,500. Those 
who had deserted prior to February 2006 were granted slightly less. Some of the former petitioners 
maintain that they never received this money. Crisis Group interview, Gastão Salsinha, Gleno, 6 
September 2011. 
11 Originally it was envisioned that those unable to return to their original homes would be given a 
choice between cash grants and alternative housing. Faced with the difficulty of finding unoccupied 
land in Dili, this was soon abandoned in favour of cash grants for everyone. 
12 “Lista veteranu falsu sei kansela hotu” [“Register of false veterans will be cancelled”], Jornal 
Bisnis Timor, 25 February 2013.  
13 Crisis Group interview, former Social Solidarity Minister Maria Domingas Alves, Dili, 18 Febru-
ary 2012. Payments range from a one-time grant of $1,380 to a life-time monthly payment of $750 
 
Timor-Leste: Stability at What Cost? 
Crisis Group Asia Report N°246, 8 May 2013 Page 4 
 
 
 
 
Both programs faced serious challenges from fraud, and while steps were taken in 
both cases to reduce the number of improper claims, this remained a serious issue.14 
Sufficient controls to reduce the incidence of fraud were not introduced from the 
outset, and as rumours spread of false claimants’ success, the flow became harder to 
stem. The size of the programs has led to demands from communities for costly 
compensation in other cases – particularly involving land –that the government is 
not always willing (and may soon be unable) to meet.15 The precedent set by insuffi-
cient fraud control may continue to plague the government as it encounters demands 
for further expansion of state largesse. 
The government also introduced more conventional cash transfers and other 
poverty reduction schemes. These are tiny in comparison to the amounts paid to 
some of the veterans, but their reach is broad; in particular, the cash grant for the 
elderly has involved monthly payments of $20 to all over 60.16 Established in May 
2008, this pensaun idozus (pension for the elderly) has proven enormously popular. 
Other, more targeted cash transfers, such as the bolsa da mãe, a single-parent’s grant 
modelled on a successful Brazilian program, have also been introduced.17 The dra-
matic expansion of the civil service and its accompanying wage bill, which swelled 
from $37.4 million to $140 million during the government’s tenure, likewise helped 
drive the increase in domestic spending.18 
These programs can be expected to help reduce poverty, protect the vulnerable 
and improve relations between citizens and the young state. They help give a large 
part of the population a vested stake in preserving stability. The primary risk is that, 
particularly when coupled with the expense of the veterans’ scheme, the state could 
become unable to afford the recurrent expenditures in the not so distant future but 
will find it difficult to roll them back.  
A further AMP priority was development of a local private sector with real skills. 
It set up procurement schemes to stimulate entrepreneurship, to encourage growth 
beyond the capital and generate a visible peace dividend. Those aims may, however, 
be at odds with another goal of the spending: to make payments to special interest 
groups, such as veterans of the resistance, few of whom have the requisite skills for 
construction or project management. While yoking together these two sets of goals is 
 
 
for a small number of leading figures. For more on the veterans’ benefit scheme, see Crisis Group 
Briefing, Timor-Leste’s Veterans: An Unfinished Struggle?, op. cit 
14 The government commissioned and published a review of the IDP returns program in 2012. “The 
National Recovery Strategy: A review of the process, results and lessons learned”, February 2012.  
15 This difficulty is already being seen in efforts by the government to free up land in Dili and the 
planned Tasi Mane (south coast) development area. See Section IV.C below.  
16 This has since increased to $30 a month, paid quarterly, and there is talk of increasing it to $50. 
As with other transfer payment programs, the government has faced significant complaints regard-
ing who should be paid. See “Politika aumenta osan idozus la realiza” [“Policy to increase old-age 
payments not implemented”], Independente, 16 January 2013. The importance of the cash payments 
is underscored by the population bulge among those aged 60-64 revealed by the 2010 census: there 
were 67 per cent more people in this age range (37,333) than between 55 and 59 (22,346). “Popula-
tion and Housing Census of Timor-Leste, 2010”, finance ministry directorate of national statistics, 
vol. 2, pp. 53-54. 
17 Ultimately the program is intended to be a conditional transfer, granted in exchange for primary 
school enrolments and inoculations for young children, but monitoring of these conditions is not 
yet fully in place.  
18 Comparing figures from the 2006-2007 and the 2012 state budgets. Until 2007, the fiscal year 
ran from 1 July. Since 2008, the calendar and fiscal years have been identical. Budget documents 
back to 2005 are available on the finance ministry’s website, www.mof.gov.tl. 
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a familiar strategy in post-conflict development environments, the latter weakens 
the former. 
The practice of linking government spending with generation of a peace dividend 
emerged in 2009, with introduction of the Referendum Package (Pakote Referendum), 
named for the ten-year anniversary of the 1999 vote for independence. The govern-
ment had struggled to spend money in the 2009 budget set aside for infrastructure 
(it had been dubbed the Year of Infrastructure), and in August it reallocated $75 mil-
lion in unspent funds to Timorese contracting firms for small public works projects. 
This money was distributed through a private body, the Association of Civil Con-
struction and Public Works Entrepreneurs (AECCOP).19 Many questions were raised 
but left unanswered about the quality of execution of these projects; the real goal, 
though, appears to have been to get money flowing.20 
Expanded versions of the scheme, which became known as the Decentralised De-
velopment Program (Programa de Desenvolvimento Descentralizado, PDD), were 
rolled out in subsequent years. To be eligible for the contracts, companies had to be 
legally based in the districts, which led to a flurry of newly registered businesses. Infra-
structure projects of up to $500,000 were distributed through district-level award 
committees, comprised of local officials.21  
The publicly-expressed goals were to stimulate development of a local private 
sector with construction experience and to “fast track rural development”.22 The 
schemes also helped respond to some of the pressures for more spending in rural 
areas that had built up after planned decentralisation of power to district-level gov-
ernments was deferred in 2010 until 2014 or later.  
Another goal was likely patronage, in part for rewarding party loyalty, but also for 
paying off spoilers. CNRT has strong links with business – underscored in a brief 
campaign-financing scandal in May/June 2012, when a number of leading business-
es emerged as major supporters.23 But access to contracts is by no means exclusive: 
even businesses closely aligned with the Fretilin opposition have continued to bene-
fit from them. A senior minister who has served since 2007 explained that among 
AMP’s primary challenges on taking office was to introduce greater “flexibility” into 
 
 
19 The acronym comes from the Portuguese name: Associação Empresarios Construção Civil e 
Obras Públicas.  
20 Much of this criticism came from the opposition. See, for example, Aniceto Guterres, “Intervensaun 
husi Bancada Fretilin molok votasaun iha voto iha generalidade iha debate orsamentu rectificativu 
2010 nian” [“Intervention by the Fretilin bench before voting on the 2010 rectifying budget”], 
speech delivered on 24 June 2010 and available at fretilinmedia.blogspot.com/2010/06/bancada-
fretilin-nia-intervensaun-iha.html. 
21 The PDD projects are broken into two different levels: PDD I, for contracts up to $150,000, and 
PDD II, for those up to $500,000. Some details of the PDD project are in “Programa de Desenvol-
vimento Descentralizado I e II” [“Decentralised Development Program I and II”], Decree 18/2011, 
5 May 2011. 
22 “Referendum package to rebuild Timor’s rural areas”, government press release, 28 October 2009. 
23 As part of a one-night total of at least $2.35 million publicly pledged, commitments of $50,000 
to $250,000 were made at a CNRT fundraiser in May 2012 by a number of businesses, including, 
reportedly, Indonesian and Chinese firms. These appeared to violate campaign-finance provisions 
barring contributions by companies of any kind or foreign individuals. “Final Report, Parliamentary 
Election 2012”, EU Election Observation Mission, October 2012, pp. 16-17. CNRT denied receiving 
any illegal contributions. “Timor PM’s party denies receiving illegal political donations”, ABC Radio 
Australia, 22 May 2012.  
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a transparent government tender system.24 Quality of execution remained a concern 
but never appeared to be the main goal.25  
The beneficiaries are thus a mix of an emerging business class with good family 
and political connections and those with proven potential to use violence against the 
state. One who has benefited is Lito Rambo, a former associate of the pro-independ-
ence guerrillas. A recent newspaper profile described the listlessness he experienced 
after independence, when he became an influential gang leader in the Dili suburb of 
Becora, an area where violence between easterners and westerners flared during the 
2006 crisis.26 Following introduction of the Referendum Package, he became a con-
tractor, beginning by building retaining walls and doing road drainage projects. Oth-
ers include Rai Los, convicted in 2009 for leading a hit squad during the 2006 crisis 
but released from prison following the commutation of his sentence and now chair-
man of the Liquiça chamber of commerce. Susar, a petitioner convicted (but quickly 
pardoned) for his role in leading the group implicated in the 2008 attack on the 
president and acquitted of involvement in the 23 May 2006 police-army shoot-out in 
Fatu Ahi, is another contractor.27 
The contracts were also instrumental in providing a counterpoint to another po-
tentially destabilising political development: the rise of a class of former supporters 
of integration with Indonesia to cabinet posts and government contracts. Gusmão 
had always been a staunch supporter of reconciliation, and his August 2007 cabinet 
included a number of those known as “pro-autonomists”. Anger at the wealth and 
status being acquired by these supposed former enemies of independence was a major 
factor driving expansion of veterans’ benefits and, later, special access to contracts 
for veterans.28 
Taken together, the AMP government’s aggressive expansion of spending, in par-
ticular through compensation payments, cash transfers and local-level contracting, 
constitute an expensive and risky strategy for shoring up stability that yielded some 
notable success. The most immediate risk is economic: the speed of fiscal expansion 
has pushed annual inflation to around 11 per cent since 2011, making this country 
with a very small population of skilled workers expensive for both investors and its 
own residents. It has created a dependent population with high expectations of gov-
ernment handouts and of easy contracts to build second-rate infrastructure. And 
while the rise of a middle class centred in Dili is notable, the rural population remains 
among Asia’s poorest.29 All this makes Timor-Leste vulnerable to economic shocks, 
particularly when oil and gas revenues begin to drop.  
 
 
24 Crisis Group interview, senior minister, Dili, 19 November 2012. 
25 See for example, “PDD-PDL Balun Kualidade Laek” [“Some PDD-PDL projects without quality”], 
Jornal Bisnis Timor, 20 February 2012; “Projeito Pakote Referendum Laiha Kualidade” [“Referen-
dum Package Projects are without quality”], Timor Today, 2 May 2010.  
26 “Brutalismu TNI di mata Lito Rambo” [“The brutalism of the TNI in the eyes of Lito Rambo”], 
Suara Timor Lorosae, 8 February 2013. 
27 See Mark Harris, “Security Sector Reform (SSR) Monitor: Timor-Leste”, Center for International 
Governance Innovation, no. 4, January 2011. 
28 Crisis Group interview, former Social Solidarity Minister Maria Domingas Alves, Dili, 18 Febru-
ary 2012. 
29 The rural-urban wealth divide is particularly pronounced in Timor-Leste, where 71 per cent of 
Dili residents are in the highest wealth quintile, while 72 per cent of rural residents are in the three 
lowest wealth quintiles. “Timor-Leste Health and Demographic Survey 2009-2010”, finance minis-
try national statistics directorate, December 2010, Table 2.11. 
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The emerging political economy is also at risk of future deadly conflict. The pat-
ronage system of rewarding violent spoilers with contracts, coupled with the near 
impunity for the 1999 and 2006-2008 political violence, threatens to promote a 
dangerous dynamic seen in other fragile post-conflict situations, in which violence 
is perceived to offer rewards – or at least to be without downside – raising further 
prospects for recurrence.  
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II. Political Stability 
Following the 2012 elections, Timorese politics are stable, but not necessarily healthy. 
The concentration of electoral support behind just four parties allowed for the quick 
formation of a less volatile coalition. The process was tense, but unlike in 2007, it 
was not violent. The electoral season was also testament to the increased political 
clout of the veterans and how time served in the resistance remains the primary 
source of political legitimacy. Voters elected former commanders of the guerrilla 
army as heads of state and government. But with a president who is the former sub-
ordinate of the prime minister, political power is worryingly concentrated around 
one man: Xanana Gusmão. 
A. Presidential Elections 
Two rounds of presidential voting in March and April 2012 set the tone for the July 
parliamentary polls. Presidential candidates compete without official party identifi-
cation, but party support undoubtedly influences the campaigns. It also means that 
the presidential poll becomes a proxy contest for the subsequent parliamentary race; 
parties vie for a show of strength that will bolster their fortunes as they head into the 
next election, and there has been a loose correlation between the fortunes of a presi-
dential candidate and the parties who offer their support. 
There were early questions over which candidate Fretilin would endorse. Some, 
particularly those with strong connections to the armed resistance, thought it would 
be wise to support Ruak, whose potential candidacy quickly generated buzz follow-
ing his retirement from the armed forces in October 2011. However, he was unwill-
ing to campaign under the Fretilin flag, which meant the party would have lost valu-
able exposure in the run-up to the parliamentary poll. Some members would have 
been happy to pay that price, but party statutes require it to support its own president, 
so in the end, it stuck with Francisco “Lu Olo” Guterres, its longstanding party head. 
The key remaining strategic question was whom Xanana Gusmão would support. 
Elected president in 2002 with 83 per cent of the vote, he is seen by many as the 
kingmaker in Timorese politics. His support was also a key factor in José Ramos-
Horta’s 2007 victory. Long before the election, Gusmão had taken to jokingly confer-
ring his support on different candidates, interrupting a meeting to suggest former 
Justice Minister Lúcia Lobato stand for president and placing his red Falintil beret 
on the head of the then president of parliament, Fernando “Lasama” de Araújo, fol-
lowing the 2011 demobilisation of 236 leading veterans. 
Gusmão and CNRT deferred a decision on an official endorsement until late in 
the campaign, leaving open where their support lay. Following its national confer-
ence on 7-8 January, the party announced that it had not endorsed a candidate, 
agreeing instead upon a set of values that any president should have.30 But days be-
fore the first round, Gusmão appeared on the campaign trail with his former comrade, 
in a move that undoubtedly strengthened Ruak. Concerns about Ruak’s role in the 
2006 crisis – an investigation into his alleged involvement in distribution of weap-
ons to former veterans was set aside in 2010 after the prosecutor-general deemed it 
“too political” – might otherwise have weighed more heavily.31 
 
 
30 “Kandidatu PR CNRT iha kritéria propriu” [“CNRT has its own criteria for presidential candi-
dates”], Suara Timor Lorosae, 19 January 2012. 
31 See Crisis Group Briefing, Timor-Leste: Time for the UN to Step Back, op. cit. 
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Despite Gusmão’s late support, Ruak finished second in the first round, trailing 
Lu Olo 28 to 25 per cent. The bulk of the remaining votes went to Lasama and Ramos-
Horta, each about 18 per cent, leaving open whom they would support in the second 
round. Ramos-Horta, who has no party of his own, tried to organise an alliance with 
Lasama and PD to support Lu Olo and against Ruak (and by extension, Gusmão). 
This failed in part because of a split within PD; Lasama originally hinted at support 
of Lu Olo, Vice President Lurdes Bessa campaigned for Lu Olo, and Secretary-Gen-
eral Mariano Sabino backed Ruak. It is also unlikely that PD’s base would ever have 
accepted supporting Fretilin. 
In second-round voting on 16 April, Ruak won 61 per cent of the vote, carrying all 
districts except the Fretilin strongholds of Baucau and Viqueque.32 With a turnout 
rate of 73 per cent (down from 78 per cent in the first round), this meant Ruak still 
failed to attract more than half the registered voters. 
Given their prominence in helping mobilise support, particularly for Ruak but also 
for Lu Olo, the influence of veterans’ groups may be lasting. This is important because 
a defining feature of politics before Ruak’s retirement had been the diversity of politi-
cal affiliations among the leading veterans of the armed resistance. This apartida-
rismo (non-partisanship) was a feature of the Timorese resistance that many veterans 
themselves acknowledged to be an important contribution to blocking exclusive vet-
erans’ influence over the state. By appealing first and foremost to his resistance-era 
legacy rather than party affiliation, leading a number of people to cross party lines to 
support their former commander, Ruak may have changed political dynamics in a 
way that could have important repercussions if he ever enters party politics.  
B. Parliamentary Elections 
The parliament elected on 6 July 2012 was a streamlined version of its predecessor: 
a CNRT-led coalition with two partners instead of four and only Fretilin in opposi-
tion. CNRT and Fretilin each increased their representation, winning 30 and 25 seats 
respectively (from eighteen and 21). PD held steady with eight seats, while the newly 
registered party, Frenti-Mudansa, won two.33 A raft of smaller parties attracted some 
20 per cent of the vote but won no seats, as they failed to cross the 3 per cent threshold. 
CNRT’s extra seats came at the expense of old coalition partners: the Social-
Democrat Party (PSD) and the ASDT. PSD’s fortunes had been falling since its ex-
pulsion from the coalition. That began with the resignation of party founder Mário 
Carrascalão as vice prime minister in March 2010 and was followed by the very pub-
lic embarrassment of Foreign Minister (and party president) Zacarias da Costa in a 
specially broadcast meeting of the Council of Ministers.34 The May 2012 suspension 
of Justice Minister Lobato (a party vice president) and her sentencing the next 
month (subsequently appealed) in connection with a procurement scandal also hurt 
 
 
32 In Lautém, traditionally a base of Fretilin support, there was nearly a dead heat, as Ruak won by 
13,555 votes to 13,340. In the district’s parliamentary contests, Fretilin received 44 per cent, followed 
by PD (21 per cent) and CNRT (20 per cent). District-level results available at www.stae.tl/elections/ 
2012/rezultado/parlamentar/. 
33 Frenti-Mudança, headed by current Foreign Minister José Luis Guterres, originally emerged as a 
splinter from Fretilin following the 2006 party congress but was first formally registered in July 2011. 
34 In April 2010, after da Costa appeared to contradict the prime minister over whether all ambas-
sadors should fly home for a Development Partners’ Meeting, he was given a dressing down by Gus-
mão on television and subsequently maintained a less active profile. 
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the party. ASDT was badly weakened by the March 2012 death of its leader, “Avo 
Xavier” (Francisco Xavier do Amaral), who led the declaration of independence in 
November 1975. A messy, still unresolved leadership battle followed, pitting the AMP 
tourism and commerce minister, Gil Alves, against his predecessor as party secretary 
general, João Correia. 
CNRT from the outset tried to create an impression that its success was inevita-
ble. A year before the election, it announced the ambitious goal of 45 seats, over two 
thirds of the total.35 It may have gained some momentum from the presidential 
campaign, in part due to its association with Ruak and his success (the elections 
commission reprimanded the party for displaying his photograph on its materials).  
CNRT was also the best-funded party and used its advantage to organise a far great-
er number of rallies and large campaign events. Others focused more on efforts to 
get out the vote through door-to-door campaigning in areas of strong support.36 The 
larger number of rallies made it easier for CNRT to dominate local media coverage.37 
More than anything, the party seemed to build a sense of inevitability through 
government spending. This was achieved in part through programs with which it was 
strongly aligned. The most important was the largest-ever disbursement of payments 
to veterans. $46 million was disbursed to them in June 2012 alone, as the campaign 
kicked off. At the same time, Secretary of State for Vocational Training and Employ-
ment Opportunities (and senior CNRT figure) Bendito Freitas announced a major 
expansion of the $3-a-day work program, which distributed $20 million that same 
month.38 
CNRT also benefited from the emergence of splinter groups designed to support 
Gusmão himself and not the party. These included the “Independent Commission to 
support the Maximal Leader Xanana Gusmão” and a smaller group that called itself 
Fretilin Resistensia (Fretilin Resistance). Typical statements included this from 
António Cardoso, a disaffected former Fretilin parliamentarian: “We recognise only 
the maximal leader Xanana as the one who knows best the history of Fretilin; not a 
Fretilin that was built after independence by those who had just arrived from abroad”.39 
Gusmão the brand remained far stronger than CNRT the party, which modified its 
official ballot symbol to include his face superimposed on the CNRT flag. 
Other parties struggled to match the strong momentum of the CNRT campaign. 
Fretilin tried to attract new voters by focusing on alleged corruption in the AMP gov-
ernment and frustration over social justice, weak courts and impunity. While that 
message appeared to resonate with the party’s base, it won over few new voters: the 
 
 
35 See, for example, “Xanana: CNRT tenki hetan kadeira 45” [“Xanana: CNRT must get 45 seats”], 
Centru Jornalista Investigativu Timor Leste (CJITL) Online, 18 April 2011. 
36 A newspaper reported allegations of illegal campaign contributions in mid-June, claiming CNRT 
had raised $2.35 million in one night, much of it from Timorese and foreign businesses, an appar-
ent violation of campaign financing laws. Opposition groups seized on this, but CNRT denied re-
ceiving any illegal contributions, the scandal seemed to die down as the campaign began, and no 
results of any investigation have appeared. 
37 All newspapers devoted considerably more attention to CNRT. See “Final Report, Parliamentary 
Election 2012”, op. cit., pp. 19-21. 
38 Freitas is now the education minister. The EU Election Observation Mission noted that the pro-
gram had been run in earlier years on a far smaller scale ($895,000 in 2010), ibid, p. 17. 
39 Comments by António Cardoso at a CNRT rally in Zumalai, as cited in “Ami hatene Fretilin mak 
Xanana” [“We know that Fretilin is Xanana”], Timor Post, 29 June 2012. 
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party’s share of the vote increased less than one percentage point between 2007 and 
2012.40 
PD had sought to broaden its base by alliance with José Ramos-Horta, but it gained 
little from this, as its share of the vote fell slightly to just over 10 per cent. One rea-
son is that the alliance was never a unanimous party decision: while party banners 
quickly carried pictures of Ramos-Horta smiling between Mariano Sabino and Lasa-
ma, the former was never heard to support the alliance. The imagery suggested an 
alliance between what are often referred to as the “older generation” of 1975 political 
leaders and the “younger generation” that PD was largely founded to support. This 
was a message Ramos-Horta frequently drew upon during the campaign, speaking of 
the need to transfer political power to younger figures, while retaining the supervi-
sion of the elders.  
A senior PD personality explained that the party had clearly made two key mis-
takes. Throughout the campaign, it sent inconsistent messages about coalition pro-
spects, but it was widely believed PD would ultimately join a CNRT-led government. 
Potential PD voters, preferring to back a winner and seeing little differentiation be-
tween the two, simply voted for CNRT. At the same time, in aligning itself with Ramos-
Horta, who became an increasingly outspoken critic of Gusmão during the cam-
paign, it scared off many voters fearful of backing any challenge to the latter.41 
Several Fretilin members took away from the election the lesson that in the current 
political dynamic, no one other than the party president, Mari Alkatiri, can publicly 
challenge Gusmão without looking weaker.42 They suggested Alkatiri is an exception 
for two reasons: he is identified as being from the same generation of leaders; and 
the antagonism between Gusmão and him has long been familiar to voters.43 
The key issue for the major parties, particularly as the campaign wore on, was 
their relationship with Gusmão. Lasama told voters that if PD won, it would adopt a 
model that Timorese papers rendered as liukanliu, referring to Lee Kwan Yew, the 
Singapore “father of the state” who, following 31 years as prime minister, remained 
in cabinet as a senior adviser.44 Alkatiri and other senior Fretilin figures tried to keep 
the idea of a coalition government open until the end. Gusmão himself never reject-
ed that possibility, and by leaving it at least theoretically open as long as possible, 
may have further strengthened the sense of his own primacy. 
In the absence of polling data or qualitative research on how voters made choices, 
it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about the results. But it remains an open ques-
tion whether support for CNRT was largely a matter of support for the record of the 
AMP government, support for Gusmão, or fear and uncertainty about what politics 
might be like were he voted out of office. 
 
 
40 In 2007, Fretilin received 120,592 votes (29.02 per cent); in 2012, it received 140,786 votes 
(29.87 per cent). It gained four seats at the expense of parties that did not make the threshold.  
41 Crisis Group interview, senior PD figure, Dili, 13 September 2012. 
42 Crisis Group interviews, CCF members, Dili, 7 and 13 November 2012.  
43 Alkatiri was among the 1974 founders of the Associação Social Democrata Timorense (ASDT), 
renamed Fretilin in the same year, and served as the economic and political affairs minister in the 
cabinet appointed following its 28 November 1975 unilateral declaration of independence.  
44 The spelling in the newspapers suggests some local journalists did not know who Lee Kuan Yew 
was.“‘Mai Ita Hamutuk!’, Xanana PM Senior” [“‘Let’s come together!’, Xanana as senior PM”], Ti-
mor Post, 25 June 2013. Lee, often referred to as the city-state’s “founding father”, was its prime 
minister from 1959 to 1990, overseeing its transition to full independence in 1965 and leading the 
People’s Action Party to eight successive victories. He remained in cabinet in an advisory role, first 
as senior minister (1990-2004), then minister mentor (2004-2011). 
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C. Forming a Government 
One of the primary fears of many observers regarding the 2012 elections was that the 
parties would refuse to accept either the results or the government that was ultimately 
formed, as had happened in August 2007, when CNRT formed a ruling coalition de-
spite having won fewer seats than Fretilin. 
Tensions around government formation were more limited in 2012. In part, the 
simpler distribution of seats within parliament made the process clearer: after CNRT 
carried close to half the total, putting together a coalition required less effort. The 
real question became whether CNRT would offer Fretilin a role. Public discussions 
began over the benefits of either a government of national unity (both parties joining 
a single government) or an inclusive government (formed by CNRT but including 
certain Fretilin figures in the cabinet). The Fretilin leadership publicly insisted on a 
coalition. Discussions between CNRT and Fretilin representatives seem, however, to 
have gone only as far as possible inclusion of a handful of Fretilin figures within a 
CNRT-led cabinet, on condition they joined as unaffiliated independents.45 This was 
unacceptable to the Fretilin leadership. 
These discussions came to a head at the CNRT party conference on 15 July, when 
delegates met to formally discuss the options in a session broadcast live on national 
television. It is likely a decision had already been made. During the conference, a 
handful of party figures made what Fretilin supporters and even independent ob-
servers viewed as “inflammatory comments” about the former ruling party and why 
a coalition was undesirable.46 That night, violence broke out on the streets of Dili, 
less a result of the CNRT decision than the manner in which it was taken. Fretilin 
supporters argued that the meeting had been televised to embarrass their party, and 
some rioted in Dili that night.47 The killing of a party supporter by police the next 
day (see Section III.B below) had the potential to escalate the situation further, but 
after the party leadership sent strong messages that it would not tolerate violence, 
tensions subsided somewhat.  
D. Stagnation or Stability? 
Following formation of the government, the legislature and executive are stable in 
configuration, but weak in terms of implementation and performance. 
1. The executive 
The current government has expanded the cabinet while centralising power among 
a handful of ministers. With 55 members, the cabinet is nearly the same size as the 
parliament. A smaller group of fifteen comprise the Council of Ministers, the govern-
ment’s chief decision-making body. The prime minister has retained a large amount 
of spending power for himself, a process that began under the 2011 budget to move 
control over the bulk of infrastructure spending out of the infrastructure ministry 
 
 
45 Crisis Group interviews, Fretilin and CNRT party figures, Dili, November 2012. 
46 See Fundasaun Mahein, “Fundasaun Mahein (FM)’s observations on the party conference of Con-
gresso Nacional Reconstrução de Timor-Leste (CNRT)”, 15 July 2012, at www.fundasaunmahein. 
org/2012/07/16/fundasaun-mahein-fm-nia-observasaun-ba-konferensia-partido-congresso-nacional- 
reconstrucao-de-timor-leste-cnrt/. 
47 Sara Everingham, “Violence as East Timor moves towards coalition govt”, ABC Radio, 16 July 
2012. 
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and into an autonomous fund. The prime minister now directly controls roughly half 
the budget.48 
Two holdovers from the AMP administration have particular influence: Ágio Pe-
reira, in the new post of minister of state, and Emília Pires, who remains finance 
minister. Pereira, a former independence activist in exile, has worked for Gusmão 
since he was elected president in 2002 and was the spokesman for the AMP admin-
istration. During the month-long campaign, Gusmão delegated almost all his powers 
to Pereira. Pires retains an important management role as finance minister, though 
perhaps with somewhat reduced influence following creation of the infrastructure 
fund under the prime minister. She is also increasingly a face of the government 
abroad as chair of the G7+ group of fragile states. Both were members of the diaspo-
ra that fled to Australia in the 1970s and are known as strong managers, but because 
they were absent during the struggle against the Indonesia, it is not clear that they 
would possess political legitimacy separate from Gusmão. 
2. The legislature 
Parliament during the AMP’s tenure was characterised by a passive majority and an 
active but largely ineffective opposition. It initiated almost no legislation and rarely 
made significant amendments to government bills.49  
With the opposition reduced to a single party, it may become even weaker. It is at 
least mathematically possible for the government to fall if it loses the support of all 
eight PD members, but this is very unlikely.50 In its first five months, it approved just 
two bills: a revised 2012 budget and the 2013 general state budget.51 While Fretilin 
has committed to being a vigorous opposition, it has struggled to find its voice or 
present credible alternatives. Nonetheless, in February Alkatiri spearheaded creation 
of a Fretilin-dominated ad hoc committee that cut $150 million from the govern-
ment’s proposal for the 2013 state budget, leading to discussion of what Gusmão 
called a “new political arrangement” of cooperation under which ministers must re-
port to parliament every three months.52 Alkatiri says this should make the cabinet 
more accountable. He is not a sitting member of parliament, however, though he 
temporarily took a seat for the budget debate.53 Whether the party can be effective in 
parliament without its leader will be the true test of its performance.  
 
 
48 This includes $641 million allocated under the Infrastructure Fund, which the prime minister 
controls, $103 million budgeted for the office of the prime minister, and $64 million under the de-
fence and security ministry for a total of $804 million of the $1.6 billion budget. 
49 A notable exception was the package of two draft laws that would have set up a Public Memory 
Institute and a reparations program for victims of violence between 1975 and 1999. In both instanc-
es, consideration has been repeatedly deferred since 2010. 
50 PD parliamentarians were nonetheless able to use this constructive tension to bargain for greater 
representation as committee heads. Crisis Group interview, Lurdes Bessa, PD parliamentary bench 
chair (and chair of Committee B), Dili, 13 September 2012. 
51 During this period, it also approved a change to the regime regulating private lawyers. A record of 
all legislation is kept in the government gazette, available online at www.jornal.gov.tl. See also 
“2012 Parliament Watch Project, JSMP annual report”, Judicial System Monitoring Programme, 
April 2013. 
52 “Xanana informa konjuntura politika foun ba TMR” [“Xanana tells TMR about new political ar-
rangements”], Suara Timor Lorosae, 21 February 2013. 
53 Alkatiri had been second on the party’s electoral list of representatives but deferred taking his 
seat upon election. “Líder da oposição timorense no parlamento como deputado para discusão do 
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Donors have supported some efforts to strengthen parliament, particularly its 
research and advisory services, but to little effect. A single national list system gives 
government legislators, who are elected as representatives of the party rather than 
individuals, few incentives beyond approving government legislation. There is much 
inconclusive discussion about how existing legislation is “not in keeping with Timo-
rese social reality”. One reason is that much of it is very technical, drafted by foreign 
legal experts who rely heavily on foreign precedents. Civil society criticised Ramos-
Horta for promulgating the 2,195-article Civil Code that was adopted in 2011 in less 
than 24 hours.54 But most parliamentarians lack either the resources or the expertise 
to properly scrutinise such legislation. 
One way to begin addressing this problem would be to informally engage parlia-
mentarians from both sides of the aisle earlier in the legislative process and focus on 
building consensus behind policy before a bill is drafted. Civil society should also look 
for further ways to engage with parliamentarians and the government to promote 
this process.  
3. The presidency 
With limited changes in the cabinet and an often sleepy parliament, the most dynamic 
political development has been Ruak’s election as president. Since being sworn in, 
he has underscored his independence from the prime minister and from the gov-
ernment as a whole. He welcomed the new administration to office by noting that its 
predecessor had helped drive “unbalanced development … often providing poor 
quality services”, and has emerged as one of its most public critics.55 
Ruak’s legitimacy in this role is grounded in his service with the Falintil guerrilla 
army, which he commanded after March 1998, following the death of Konis Santana. 
Service in Falintil is still the pre-eminent path to political legitimacy in Timor-Leste, 
and the very personal loyalty of a large group of veterans – particularly former 
members of the younger, more numerous clandestine wing – helps afford Ruak 
credibility his predecessor did not enjoy. This gives him more latitude to use the 
presidency as a check on the administration. In visits to poorly served rural areas, he 
has brought with him cabinet members responsible for the delivery of services and 
asked them to directly answer complaints. He has transformed the office of the pres-
idency by engaging a young and dynamic new staff to work alongside a handful of 
older, trusted advisers and tasking them with more active involvement in the work of 
government, including legislative review. His presidency will be far more inward-
looking, however, as he lacks either the interest or the familiarity with the diplomatic 
world that characterised Ramos-Horta. 
 
 
Orçamento de Estado” [“Timorese opposition leader to take seat as MP for budget discussion”], 
Lusa, 31 January 2013. 
54 “Horta aprova Proposta Lei Kodigu Sivil iha loron ida, JSMP Konfuzaun” [“Horta approves Civil 
Code in one day, JSMP is confused”], CJITL 21 September 2011. The Civil Code, approved by Law 
10/2011 of 14 September 2011, is nearly identical to Portugal’s. 
55 President Ruak’s address “on the Inauguration of the Fifth Constitutional Government”, 8 August 
2012 (English translation at easttimorlegal.blogspot.com/2012/08/the-presidents-address-on-
inauguration.html). 
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4. Future directions 
So long as the state provides a means for distributing Timor-Leste’s petroleum 
wealth to a broad swathe of the population, regardless of party affiliation, resource 
revenues are likely to promote political stability. CNRT is widely identified as the 
“big tent” party, happy to distribute benefits to a wide range of actors, including 
former political enemies – an approach Fretilin would be less likely to entertain due 
to the premium it has placed on loyalty. This difference, paired with CNRT’s strong 
embrace of business interests, will make unseating it in future elections difficult. But 
the key questions are how long the country can afford such policies, and what hap-
pens when the money runs out or if Gusmão is no longer in office? 
Complicating any transition is the rise of a construction industry class that, given 
the lack of a vigorous private sector, is dependent on government contracts. This 
diverse group emerged by trading on its links to expertise and capital in Indonesia 
(including a significant number of those who formerly supported integration with 
Jakarta), on its membership in influential families, and/or on being well-connected 
spoilers, including in several cases during the 2006 crisis. As it becomes wealthier, it 
is likely to be even more influential in politics. At present, it is a powerful supporter 
of the status quo. 
Given the almost mythic primacy afforded to Gusmão by many voters, his even-
tual exit from politics is certain to prompt a period of uncertainty and a reconfigura-
tion of power. It is not clear that the CNRT party would survive his departure, because 
it is such a disparate group of competing interests with neither an ideology nor a 
charismatic replacement for its leader. The reconfiguration, therefore, is likely to be 
messy. Sending a clear signal about when he intends to step down as prime minister 
(assuming he remains in full health) might be an important contribution to a smooth-
er transition, but Gusmão has shown a preference for leaving even his supporters 
guessing about his next move. Few give credence to comments he made in August 
2012 that he would retire in 2017.56 
A scenario already gaining currency among many in Dili in late 2012 was a cho-
reographed – though democratic – transfer of power from Gusmão to Ruak in time 
for the 2017 elections. There is still a strong strain of thinking, particularly among 
the older generation, that leaders should be anointed rather than elected.57 The rec-
ord Ruak is building as president may lessen some of the unpopularity he acquired, 
particularly in the west, for his role in the 2006 dismissal of the army petitioners. If 
he is to stand for parliament and make a bid for executive office, Ruak will either 
have to join a party or create his own. 
Whatever his future, younger politicians from PD and Fretilin will play a deter-
mining role in the post-Gusmão political landscape. PD was originally billed as the 
reformist party of the younger generation; many of its leaders grew out of the move-
ment of students educated in Indonesian universities in Java and Bali. That identity 
was difficult to maintain while associated with the anaemic performance of its minis-
ters in the AMP government, and much of its electoral appeal now is grounded in 
providing an alternative for westerners hostile to Fretilin. PD can also count on con-
 
 
56 “PM Xanana Promete Husik Kargu Iha 2017” [“PM Xanana promises to step down in 2017”], 
Independente, 9 August 2013.  
57 This appeared to be the primary goal of the “Maubisse process”, inconclusive retreats the Church 
organised in 2010-2011 for a few of the older political elite to discuss future political leadership. 
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tinued support from its strong rural networks, fed by government patronage, but the 
party remains far from united. 
Though Fretilin can find comfort in having maintained its appeal among its for-
midable base, a transfer of power at its top is a prerequisite for a stronger electoral 
showing. The party counts among its members younger figures with significant ex-
perience in either parliament or in the Alkatiri cabinet, but Alkatiri himself has 
shown little interest in resigning. Under party regulations, leadership elections are 
held only once every five years, tied to its congress (scheduled for 2016). That gives 
little time to present an image of real reform in advance of the next parliamentary 
elections. 
Both parties will have to find a way to avoid being captive to business interests. 
This is important not just to ensure cleaner politics: if they do not create their own 
identity, it will be very difficult to beat Gusmão and CNRT at their own game. 
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III. Security Sector: A Bill of Health 
Tensions within the security sector are far lower than in the pre-2006 crisis years, 
but few of the institutional reforms the UN and donors prescribed have been under-
taken. While important steps have been taken to increase the professionalism of the 
police and army, they have been taken without an overarching policy or consensus 
on future developments. This is likely to lead to competition between the institu-
tions, particularly as the security sector grows increasingly crowded. A more robust 
security sector will require difficult decisions on where responsibilities begin and 
end among its components. 
Security threats remain relatively few and these essentially domestic. As an iso-
lated country with friendly neighbours, Indonesia and Australia, it faces virtually no 
external dangers.  
Martial arts groups. As a recent incident in Sama Lete (Ermera) in which three 
persons were killed highlighted, violence between rival martial arts groups remains 
the most persistent source of internal disturbance and a consistently deadly one.58 
Police response has often been ineffective and is usually seen as insufficiently impar-
tial, as many officers are affiliated with these groups. A public ban on martial arts 
implemented in December 2011 was anecdotally seen as instrumental in keeping vio-
lence in check during the elections.59 It was renewed for a year in December 2012 
but may become more difficult to uphold over time.60 Fighting between other youth 
groups and gangs is also a recurrent problem but has generally proven less deadly. 
Dissident groups. There are few active dissident groups, but in a young state with 
developing institutions, it is relatively easy to establish competing centres of power. 
The Popular Council for the Defence of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 
(CPD-RDTL) is a loose affiliation of several thousand disaffected rural dwellers 
whose leaders continue to voice challenges to the legitimacy of the security forces.61 
It poses a limited threat of direct violence but a very public test of the rule of law. As 
the UN withdrawal approached, members began holding public rallies dressed in 
military fatigues.62 In Manufahi district, thousands massed at what the group calls a 
“farming collective”, illegally occupying rural land. For months, the parliament 
called on the prime minister to settle the problem while the police and the military 
alternately promised to expel the group by force or ignored it.63 On 25 February, the 
 
 
58 “PNTL kaptura ona suspeitu prinsipál ba kazu Sama Lete” [“Police have captured principal sus-
pects in Sama Lete case”], Independente, 27 February 2013. 
59 See Jim Della-Giacoma, “Has Timor-Leste left behind its violent past?”, Crisis Group blog, 9 July 
2012. 
60 “Meeting of the Council of Ministers on December 19, 2012”, government press release, 19 De-
cember 2012. 
61 The acronym comes from the Portuguese, Conselho Popular pela Defesa da República Democrá-
tica de Timor-Leste. 
62 “CPD-RDTL members continue wearing military uniforms and carrying machetes intimidating 
local residents”, East Timor Law and Justice Bulletin, 21 November 2012. The group held similar 
marches in advance of the UN handover to Timor-Leste’s first sovereign government in 2002. 
63 The armed forces commander, Major-General Lere, told reporters in December 2012 that he was 
“bored of talking” and was waiting for the government to act. “Lere baruk ona koalia ho CPD-
RDTL” [“Lere is tired of talking to CPD-RDTL”], Timor Post, 12 December 2012. Efforts by the gov-
ernment to reach a negotiated settlement appeared to fail, leading to the February 2013 police op-
eration to evict the occupiers. 
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Council of Ministers gave the police broad authority to evict the group, but while many 
have returned home, the issue has not yet been settled.64 
Drugs and organised crime. Weak law enforcement systems provide attractive 
refuge or transit for organised crime and the drug trade. Cooperation with the Indo-
nesian anti-narcotics agency and Singaporean authorities helped thwart a handful of 
drug traffickers in October-November 2012 who were using Dili as a transit point for 
smuggling methamphetamine into Indonesia.65 There is also some evidence of the 
involvement of foreign nationals in trafficking women into the country – economic 
growth has helped drive a burgeoning prostitution industry in the capital.66 Further 
international cooperation can help manage these challenges, but the ability to pro-
secute the crimes domestically is still developing; the drug traffickers arrested in 
October-November 2012 were sent to Indonesia for trials, even in the absence of an 
extradition treaty. 
A weak chain of command. Some steps have been taken to strengthen chains of 
command in the security forces, but a far clearer division of authority is still needed 
between the police, army, military police and intelligence service. Coordination 
seems to be working well under the current configuration of personalities, but inter-
force rivalries and jealousies exist, and without a more robust institutional frame-
work risk promoting conflict in the future. The 2006 observation that the greatest 
security threat comes from the police and the army themselves still applies, particu-
larly in light of the former’s continued acquisition of new long-barrelled weapons.67 
A. The Policy Vacuum 
The lack of a policy framework for broader security sector development is a product 
of the prime minister’s top-heavy oversight. Upon taking office in 2007, Gusmão 
merged the defence and interior ministries and appointed himself as defence and 
security minister, with personal responsibility for managing tensions between the 
police and army. Two junior secretaries of state were appointed, each to manage half 
of the double portfolio.68  
Many Timorese credit Gusmão’s personal control for making the greatest contri-
bution to stability after the 2006 crisis. He has used the authority acquired through 
his command of Falintil to keep a lid on competition between the two forces and 
 
 
64 “Extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers on February 25, 2013”, government press re-
lease, 25 February 2013. 
65 “More Indonesian drugs dealers detained, Xanana said drugs dealers used Dili as transit zone”, 
Tempo Semanal (online), 19 November 2012; “Timor-Leste jadi jalur favorit bandar narkoba” 
[“Timor-Leste becomes a favourite channel for drug smugglers”], VivaNews, 29 October 2012.  
66 Three Chinese nationals were sentenced to between thirteen and 13.5 years in prison in Decem-
ber 2011 for trafficking women into prostitution. These were Timor-Leste’s first trafficking convic-
tions. See “Trafficking in Persons Report 2012”, U.S. Department of State, June 2012. The case of 
the three Chinese nationals is believed to be still under appeal. 
67 Edward Rees, “Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Peace Operations: ‘Improvisation and Confu-
sion’ from the Field”, UN Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, March 2006. For more on police 
arms acquisition, see Fundasaun Mahein, “Paradeiru Kilat Ne’ebé Lakon La Klaru no Polemíka Ki-
lat Iha Timor-Leste” [“Lost Weapons and Other Weapons Issues in Timor-Leste”], Mahein’s Voice 
Report no. 49, 23 April 2013. 
68 Francisco da Costa Guterres (secretary of state for security) and Júlio Tomás Pinto (secretary of 
state for defence) have retained their positions in the current government. 
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stop others from building a competing power base.69 The structure has allowed Gus-
mão to play a powerful balancing act but has also stymied long-term institutional 
development and underscored that there is no clear answer to the question about 
what will happen when he is no longer there. 
Five and a half years on, no changes have been made to this structure. The cabi-
net proposal the prime minister originally transmitted to the president for approval 
and promulgation nominated Maria Domingas Fernandes Alves (known as Micató) 
as defence and security minister. As social solidarity minister, she had overseen IDP 
returns after the 2006 crisis and earned a reputation as an effective manager; it was 
thought that, as a political independent, she would have an advantage in a politicised 
sector. 
The president, however, rejected her nomination. No reason was given publicly, 
but women’s groups, including Fokupers, which Micató had helped found in 1997, 
objected to the perceived gender slight.70 Whatever Ruak’s reason, it was apparent 
there had been no consultation on the appointment, which is odd given the president’s 
constitutional role as supreme commander of the armed forces and his history as a 
former head of the F-FDTL. 
The ministry is in a politically charged position between the prime minister, the 
president and the head of the armed forces, all leading figures of the armed resistance. 
Micató, as a newcomer to security and defence affairs, is unlikely to have been a 
strong driver of policy development. 
The prime minister’s preference for a minister who would be unlikely to rock the 
boat was further reflected in his second, also unsuccessful choice. Cirílio Cristóvão 
had served for several years as head of the fledgling and weak national intelligence 
agency and is a former judge and member of the bilateral Commission on Truth and 
Friendship. His nomination was a surprise, as he has little political experience and 
few links to either the police or the military. Armed forces commander Major-Gen-
eral Lere apparently raised objections. While Cristóvão was named in the official 
gazette as minister, he was out of the country on the day the cabinet was sworn in, 
and no separate ceremony was arranged.71 Gusmão himself addressed a summit of 
Portuguese-speaking countries’ defence chiefs a week later and formally took up the 
duties of minister in a separate ceremony in October.72 
Because the joint ministry has remained principally an administrative shell, there 
appears to be little coordination or direction in policy planning.73 Formulation of a 
national security policy was left to the secretariat of state for security but has yet to 
be completed, though the Council of Ministers examined a draft in May 2012.74 
In the absence of a national security policy, the patchwork of security and defence 
laws approved by parliament appear overly ambitious, unsynchronised and almost 
 
 
69 For more on the destabilising effect of battles for influence over the security forces in the years 
before the 2006 crisis, see Crisis Group Report, Resolving Timor-Leste’s Crisis, op. cit. 
70 Janet Gunter, “East Timor: President rejects woman defence minister”, Global Voices, 9 August 
2012. 
71 See Presidential Decree no. 90/2012, 7 August 2012. 
72 See Prime Minister Gusmão’s address at his swearing-in as defence and security minister, 22 
October 2012, available at www.timor-leste.gov.tl/. 
73 In 2012, it spent just $42,000 on salaries. “Orçamento Geral do Estado 2013, Rubricas Orçamen-
tais, PR-MdJ, Livro 4A”, Government of Timor-Leste, January 2013. 
74 See “Report of Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (… 
7 January through 20 September 2012)”, 15 October 2012, S/2012/765 para 33. 
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impossible to implement. A package of three laws passed in March 2010 emerged 
from no policy process and seems largely designed to create a permanent legislative 
basis for legitimising the joint police-army operations undertaken in 2008 (see Sec-
tion II above). Few steps have been taken to implement its provisions.75 These in-
clude creation of an Integrated National Security System, which is unmentioned in 
the budget. While there appears to be strong commitment to the principle of formal-
ising police-army cooperation (requiring prior approval and coordination between 
force commanders for operations), there is little clarity on their respective roles. This 
has not been a particular problem in recent years, but the potential for trouble is 
likely to grow as the UN peacekeepers have left behind an operationally weak police 
and an army looking for a purpose. 
B. Police Development 
The withdrawal of the UN mission (UNMIT), including its 1,000-strong police con-
tingent, following the 2012 elections was predicated on a positive assessment of the 
readiness of the Timorese national force (PNTL). In most cases, the Timorese police 
had never given up practical control over operations, and since March 2011 they had 
already recovered formal responsibilities. A positive final assessment was, therefore, 
a foregone conclusion. The final report certifying the PNTL for “full reconstitution” 
has not been made public (or even shared in diplomatic circles in Dili), but it paved the 
way for a ceremony marking the end of UN policing operations on 31 October 2012. 
The PNTL nevertheless still has real limitations, as a few recent situations that it 
has been unable to contain illustrate. Since 2011, it has been unable to respond ade-
quately to vicious fighting between youth gangs in the second largest town, Baucau, 
because different factions of the district command and the local public order battal-
ion (Batalhão de Ordém Público, BOP) are seen as partial to either side. Military 
police have been consistently called in to provide back-up and are now performing 
their own patrols in the town.76 
A fatality in Hera, just east of Dili, on 15 July was allegedly caused when a police 
officer, after firing into the air to scare a young Fretilin supporter he sought to arrest, 
failed to lock the trigger and then accidentally shot the man, who bled to death.77 
There was unrest on the streets of Dili over the next two days that appeared to grow 
worse after armed forces chief Major-General Lere criticised the police for dispro-
portionate use of force.78 A Fretilin party leader suggested the criticism emboldened 
angry youth and made some police frightened to respond.79 Violence subsided only 
the next day, when Lere appeared beside the police commander, Longuinhos Mon-
teiro, and praised the police. Members of both main political parties credited Sabica 
 
 
75 Laws 2/2010, “Lei de Segurança Nacional” [“Law on national security”], 3/2010, “Lei de Defesa 
Nacional” [“Law on national defence”] and 4/2010, “Lei de Segurança Interna” [“Law on internal 
security”]. 
76 Crisis Group interview, Dili, 19 November 2012.  
77 Two senior Fretilin figures conducted their own investigation and held a press conference. “Kon-
ferencia imprensa kona ba hahalok krime husi membru Policia PNTL esquadra estasaun posto 
Hera nebe tiru mate militante Fretilin Armindo Pereira Soares iha loron 16-07-2012” [“Press con-
ference on criminal conduct by PNTL Hera post member who shot dead Fretilin supporter Armindo 
Pereira Soares”], Dili, 18 July 2012.  
78 “Lere husu lalika uza kilat hasoru fatuk” [“Lere asks [police] not to respond to stones with gun-
fire”], Radio Liberdade Dili, 18 July 2012. 
79 Crisis Group interview, Dili, 7 November 2012. 
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Besi Kulit, a senior army commander with close connections to Fretilin, for being in-
strumental in calming the situation.80 In December 2012, as the flood of firecrackers 
imported into Dili emerged as a growing public order problem, the government relied 
on joint army-police patrols to enforce a hastily drafted law banning their use.81 
It seems likely that the government will increasingly turn to such joint operations, 
given perceived weaknesses in the police and concerns over their lack of neutrality. 
There is a risk that rather than buttressing police capabilities during a period of de-
velopment, these joint patrols may perpetuate the problem.  
Three other broad areas of weakness that continue to hamper police operations 
and credibility need future attention. 
Accountability. Long identified as a challenge, there are some signs of progress 
in addressing police accountability, including a number of forums for registering 
complaints, but incidents of serious misconduct persist, and the lack of sufficient 
penalties within the PNTL remains a problem.82 Along with the perception that many 
officers, and in particular the task force incident response teams (primary respond-
ers to violence, particularly in Dili), are not impartial in violent cases, this lack of 
accountability reinforces the PNTL’s credibility problem.83 
Police shootings remain a problem, and criminal cases have had mixed results. In 
November 2009, an officer in Maliana shot a man in the stomach while firing warn-
ing shots; the criminal case was dismissed due to procedural errors in the investiga-
tion.84 Later the same month, an officer in Dili allegedly shot a teenager in the arm; 
he was acquitted due to lack of evidence in January 2011.85 In December 2009, a man 
died from bullet wounds after warning shots were used to break up a party; an in-
dictment was filed in February 2011 and a conviction secured in February 2012.86 In 
November 2011, a young woman was fatally wounded in the crossfire between two 
off-duty officers at a late-night party; one was sentenced to four years in prison in 
August 2012.87 When such delays occur, the disciplinary unit within the police (now 
known as the Justice Department) is often reluctant to pursue sanctions before crim-
inal cases are resolved, which can mean that it is several years before public results 
are obtained. 
Discipline is still a major public perception problem for the force. More worrying 
is what a senior government official identified as the chief legacy of the unsuccessful 
 
 
80 Crisis Group interviews, CNRT and Fretilin officials, Dili, September and November 2012. 
81 “Sunu paison, Xanana orienta PNTL kaer” [“Xanana orders PNTL to arrest those lighting fire-
crackers”], Timor Post, 14 December 2012; “Kontrolo sunu paison, Longuinhos-Lere diskuti 
operasaun konjunta” [“To control firecrackers, Longuinhos and Lere discuss joint operation”], Ti-
mor Post, 12 December 2012. 
82 These forums include the PNTL’s justice department, which exists both at each district command 
and at the national general command, its inspectorate general, the secretariat of state for security 
and the human rights and justice provedor (ombudsman).  
83 See “Mahein nia Lian No. 21, Dezenvolvimentu Polisia Nasional Timor-Leste (PNTL)” [“Devel-
opment of the PNTL”], Fundasaun Mahein, 21 July 2011. 
84 “Periodic Report on Human Rights in Timor-Leste, 1 July 2010-31 December 2011”, UNMIT, 
2012. 
85 “Facing the Future: Periodic Report on Human Rights Developments in Timor-Leste: 1 July 
2009-30 June 2010”, UNMIT. 
86 The police officer involved was sentenced to ten years in prison. See “Report of the Secretary-
General”, 15 October 2012, op. cit., para. 38. 
87 “Membru UPF tiru mate estudante ida iha Bobonaro” [“Border patrol member shoots dead a stu-
dent in Bobonaro”], Suara Timor Lorosae, 7 November 2011.  
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vetting and certification process: officers are “afraid to take the required measures”, 
meaning to respond to community troublemakers with force, for fear they may be 
accused of human rights violations and so barred from promotion.88 The perception 
among some officers and those in government that the police disciplinary function is 
simply a constraint on effective (and robust) policing underscores the importance of 
establishing disciplinary proceedings that are seen to check the abuse of power but 
can also recognise when force is used in a legal and proportional manner.  
Police handling of misconduct allegations may be improving. The Supreme Police 
Council (Conselho Superior da Polícia) has begun to meet regularly as the primary 
forum for dismissals and suspensions for grave misconduct.89 In November 2011, it 
recommended dismissal of seven officers for administrative offences and fraud.90 
The challenge before this body is striking: in 2011, there were more than 1,425 disci-
plinary cases waiting to be addressed.91 
Investigations. Investigative capacity remains very limited. Few officers properly 
understand the Criminal Code, and both record-keeping and storage of evidence re-
main problematic. Poor investigations lead to failed prosecutions. While cooperation 
with the prosecutions service may be improving, the gap is still wide, as much cultural 
as operational: prosecutors are better educated and more comfortable working in 
Portuguese than their police counterparts, in part a reflection of class differences. 
A district commander explained the danger lies not only in non-resolution of in-
dividual crimes, but also in further erosion of faith in the institution and the justice 
sector as a whole. The problem is not that the crimes are unsolvable; the community 
believes it knows who the culprits are, often local youths viewed as recurrent offend-
ers. When residents see them returned repeatedly by the courts with minimal parole 
requirements due to insufficient evidence, “they ask whether it is [the police’s] job to 
do anything at all”.92 
Strengthening PNTL investigative capacity is a long-term project. Plans to improve 
police responsiveness at local level are more focused on increasing numbers of offic-
ers and posts. This may help free up time for more beat patrols and improve police 
visibility in rural areas, but it will do little on its own to improve investigations. 
Over-reliance on special units and special operations. There are limited prospects 
for greater local resources, particularly given the continued centralisation of resources 
in Dili and for special units. Two major police operations in recent years have high-
lighted a dangerous trend, in which a few serious but not unusual crimes have been 
left unsolved by poorly resourced local police, leading to the mobilisation of a large-
scale operation by the special units, which do not support or conduct investigations. 
 
 
88 Crisis Group interview, member of Superior Council on Defence and Security, Dili, 2 December 
2011. 
89 The Supreme Police Council was established under the PNTL’s organic law (2009) and comprises 
the heads of the thirteen district commands and the major units. “Lei Orgânica da Polícia Nacional 
de Timor-Leste (PNTL)” [“PNTL organic law”], Decree-Law 9/2009, 10 February 2009, Article 13. 
By law it meets twice a year. It has no decision-making power but is tasked with issuing recommen-
dations to the defence and security minister regarding issues including suspension and dismissal. 
90 See “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste 
(… 20 September 2011 to 6 January 2012)”, 18 January 2012, S/2012/43. 
91 Gordon Peake, “Timor-Leste: A need for accountability not force”, The Interpreter, Lowy Insti-
tute for International Policy, 11 April 2011. 
92 Crisis Group interview, Olávio Cristovão, PNTL Lautém district commander, Lospalos, 2 Febru-
ary 2011. 
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These deployments have resulted in mass arrests or voluntary detentions without 
charges and then releases of the suspects due to the lack of prosecutable evidence. 
The first were the “anti-ninja” operations in Covalima and Bobonaro districts in 
early 2010, targeting a threat many acknowledged did not exist.93 The second, in July 
2011, was “Operation 88” in Quelicai, in the eastern district of Baucau.94 It began 
with a series of unsolved crimes: a murder, the rape of an elderly woman, and sever-
al thefts from the elderly. Unable to determine who the culprits were, the police and 
the local administration set an informal curfew: anyone out at night would be ques-
tioned by police.95 The press reported this as a “state of siege”; many local residents 
seem to have approved.96 A group of local village (suco) chiefs called for intervention 
from parliament.97 The president of parliament and the head of the parliamentary 
security and defence committee visited, and a few days later a large police operation 
was launched. 
That operation, in which over 200 police participated, included the short-term 
detention of nearly 40 persons and a handful of arrests for theft and damage.98 The 
UN and local civil society noted a number of complaints from the local population, 
including allegations of “unlawful arrest and ill-treatment of at least twenty per-
sons”.99 The district commander explained this as the natural outcome of an opera-
tion in which officers were overworked, housed in poor condition and underfed.100  
Part of the appeal of special operations is that they attract extra resources (opera-
tional per diem) and police with better equipment and training. Such operations 
may exert an immediate, short-term chilling effect on local troublemakers, but it 
does not improve long-term law enforcement. The cycle risks become self-reinforcing: 
more resources will be allocated to the special units to support such responses, while 
local criminal investigations and community engagement will continue to be inade-
quate. Another problem is the belief among many that “community policing” – un-
derstood as focused on improving constructive communication between police and 
the community – is not the solution, and that what is lacking is sufficient fear of the 
police. 
An area in which some progress has been made is implementation of promotion 
reform. This is a key part of long-term professionalisation, but the gains to date are 
 
 
93 See Crisis Group Briefing, Timor-Leste: Time for the UN to Step Back, op. cit.; and “Human 
rights situation in Covalima and Bobonaro”, HAK Association, 15 February 2010. 
94 The operation’s name became the subject of much speculation. The police explained it came from 
the official licence plates given to all parliamentarians, which feature a distinctive “88” (the number 
of seats in the first parliament), as the operation arose from a parliamentary request. For many 
Timorese, however, “88” more quickly calls to mind the elite anti-terrorism detachment of the In-
donesian police, Densus-88. A Timorese security sector NGO criticised the police over the name, 
calling it alarmist in a country with limited risk of terrorism. “Saida mak Operasaun Ualu-Ualu 
(88)?” [“What is Operation 88?”], Fundasaun Mahein, 10 August 2011. A local officer gave a third 
explanation: that the deployment of forces from all neighbouring districts to the mountainous inte-
rior schematically resembled a figure eight. Crisis Group interview, 10 August 2011. 
95 Crisis Group interview, Faustino da Costa, Baucau district police commander, Baucau, 10 August 
2011. 
96 Crisis Group interviews, Quelicai, 10 August 2011; and “Polisia Baucau nega ‘estado de sitiu’ iha 
Quelicai” [“Baucau police deny ‘state of siege’”], Suara Timor Lorosae, 5 May 2011. 
97 Crisis Group interview, Laisorelai suco chief, Baucau, 10 August 2011. 
98 “Periodic Report on Human Rights in Timor-Leste, 1 July 2010-31 December 2011”, op. cit. 
99 “Report of the Secretary-General”, 14 October 2011, op. cit., para. 37. 
100 Crisis Group interview, Faustino da Costa, PNTL district commander, Baucau, 10 August 2011. 
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tenuous.101 A first round of promotions, completed in March 2010, inevitably left 
many officers disgruntled, including some old-timers who had failed to prepare for 
the competency exam (the first step toward promotion). A frequently cited complaint 
was that the subsequent allocation of roles upset what chains of command existed 
within the PNTL: when high-flying “newcomers” were advanced over those who had 
spent more time in command roles, new problems with absenteeism and discipline 
emerged.102 
In part due to fears that discontent might spread, a second round of promotions 
was quickly announced, which many officers seemed to interpret as indicating that 
those who had failed would simply be given a pass this time.103 Special criteria were 
announced for veterans of the armed resistance, a small but influential group, so 
that time counted in a command role during the resistance would lead to automatic 
promotion. The second round has come under heavy criticism from police and par-
liamentarians for having non-transparent criteria; the prime minister is also said to 
have grown angry during an April 2013 Council of Ministers meeting over perceived 
failures in the process.104  
In keeping with the pace of professionalisation and improved management at 
command levels, some decentralisation of budgetary powers would likely go far to 
free up resources and improve efficiency. A district commander explained that to ob-
tain a $5 oil change for a district police vehicle, he must spend $50 for petrol and set 
aside two working days for staff to transport it to Dili and back again.105 
If they are to be resolved, all these issues will require the leadership and vision of 
a well-respected commander. The government has not yet decided on whether to 
replace Longuinhos Monteiro, who took the post in 2009 after serving as prosecu-
tor-general. As his second two-year term was due to expire at the end of March, the 
government extended him for three months.106 
C. An Expansionist Military? 
The military, unlike the police, was the subject of very little UN attention, but its 
pace of reform may have been quicker. It has more than doubled in size, and a raft of 
new legislation, including its own promotions law has been introduced.107 
 
 
101 The reform, which also expanded the number of ranks in the PNTL from four to twelve, is de-
scribed in Crisis Group Briefing, Timor-Leste: Time for the UN to Step Back, op. cit. 
102 Crisis Group interview, senior police officer, Dili, 25 November 2010. 
103 The legislative basis for this second round – formally referred to as the Extraordinary Promo-
tions Period – was agreed in February 2012. See “Período Extraordinário de Promoções na PNTL” 
[“Extraordinary period of PNTL promotions”], Decree 22/2012, 10 April 2012. 
104 “PN ejiji investiga promosaun deviza iha PNTL” [“Parliament calls for investigation into PNTL 
rank promotion”], Suara Timor Lorosae, 16 April 2013 ; “Xanana hakilar Francisco Guterres” 
[“Xanana shouts at Francisco Guterres”], Radio Liberdade, 3 April 2013. The first lady, Isabel Fer-
reira, who has chaired the promotions process (having served as legal adviser to Guterres) has in-
sisted the process was both rigorous and impartial. 
105 Crisis Group interview, Justinho Menezes, Viqueque district commander, Viqueque, 22 May 
2012. 
106 “KM extende tan mandatu komisariu PNTL ba fulan tolu” [“Council of Ministers extends PNTL 
commander’s mandate by three months”], Tempo Semanal (online), 26 March 2013. 
107 For more on the development of the armed forces since 2006, see “Konsolidasaun instituisaun 
F-FDTL liu tiha krize 2006 no komandante nia lideransa” [“Institutional strengthening of the F-
FDTL since the 2006 crisis and leadership of the new command”], Fundasaun Mahein, 30 October 
2012.  
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Following the desertion of the petitioners and the 2006 crisis, only 791 troops 
remained in the army, but it has returned to the pre-crisis level following two waves 
of recruitment and now has a strength of 1,873. In 2012, authorisation was given to 
double in size to a maximum of 3,600 by 2020, with 500 due to be recruited in 2013.108 
The question of what all these troops are to do has not been answered. Although 
the army and the defence secretariat have developed a more comprehensive set of 
operational guidance than the police and emphasised developing naval capability 
and military engineering, supply is likely to outstrip demand for the military’s ser-
vices in a country with almost no external threats. A light naval force is expected to 
comprise up to a quarter of the total armed forces by 2020.109 This has been hobbled 
by the poor state of the fleet: two $14-million Shanghai-class river patrol boats 
(bought from China) and three Sea Dolphin class patrol boats (donated by South Ko-
rea) were added in 2011-2012 but are not suited to patrol the south coast’s choppy 
waters. Maintenance and training issues have also complicated naval operations: a 
leaked 2011 audit noted that combined time at sea for the entire fleet was three days 
during the first four months of 2011.110 A temporary port in Hera on which more 
than $7 million has been spent embarrassed the government, when the wharf col-
lapsed before it had even been opened. 
In early 2012, before the elections, the army deployed to nine of thirteen districts 
to back up the police. Rather than withdraw them afterwards, it has now deployed a 
platoon (33 soldiers) to all districts except Lautém, on two-month rotations as a way 
of increasing “familiarisation with the terrain”.111 This is a major change in strategy; 
until 2012, there were such deployments only at two border stations in Tunubibi 
(Maliana) and Tilomar (Suai).112 The deployments will increase the army’s visibility, 
especially after the dissident CPD-RDTL’s rallies and demonstrations in different 
parts of the country.113 They are also likely to be used to bolster intelligence and civil-
military cooperation; in 2010, a platoon sent to Fatubessi, Ermera district, following 
unusual activity in the area, helped gather intelligence while repairing schools and 
health centres.114 
Particularly in light of the new territorial deployments, there is more work to be 
done on discipline and accountability. The military has faced disciplinary challenges 
similar to those of the police (though fewer, given the limited nature of its opera-
 
 
108 “Efectivo autorizado para as FALINTIL-FDTL até 2020” [“Authorised force strength for Falintil-
FDTL until 2020”], Government Resolution 28/2011, 21 September 2011. 
109 The authorised strength of 3,600 was broken up as follows: F-FDTL Command (Comando das 
F-FDTL), 174; Ground Force Component (Componente da Força Terrestre), 1,343; Light Naval 
Force (Componente da Força Naval Ligeira), 989; Service and Support Unit (Componente de Apoio 
de Serviços), 560; Training (Componente de Formação e Treino), 250; Air Support (Componente de 
Apoio Aéreo), 120; Military Police (Polícia Militar), 164. 
110 “Review of procurement system for the Ministry of Finance: Review of procurement in the Min-
istry of Defence and Security for the period 1 January 2009 to 30 June 2011”, Deloitte, July 2012, in 
“Exclusive Tempo Semanal leaks of Deloitte docs”, Tempo Semanal (online), 8 November 2012. 
111 Crisis Group interview, F-FDTL officer, Dili, 15 November 2012. 
112 These were set up in 2009. The AMP government’s original five-year plan had been to transfer 
border security responsibilities from the police to the army, but this was never done. 
113 A tenet of CPD-RDTL’s leadership is that the PNTL and the F-FDTL are sham security forces set 
up by the international community, and that no legitimate army has yet been established.  
114 Crisis Group interview, Colonel Filomeno Paixão, Chefe-Estado-Maior of the F-FDTL, Tasi Tolu, 
16 June 2010. 
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tions).115 While six soldiers were indicted in April 2012 for their role in the August 
2010 death of a civilian in Lautém, and a soldier was dismissed after being convicted 
in October 2011 for killing an elderly woman, it is still remembered that the armed 
forces resolutely protected its members from serving any time for crimes committed 
during the 2006 crisis.116 
D. A More Crowded Security Sector 
The lack of clear divisions of responsibility between police and army is only one of 
many problems. The security sector may be becoming even more crowded, and as a 
result, the distribution of power may become more contested.  
Plans to develop a separate criminal investigation police (Polícia de Investigação 
Criminal, PIC), a common feature of most civil law justice systems, first took shape 
under the direction of former Justice Minister Lúcia Lobato.117 The body would sup-
port the judicial authorities, report to the justice ministry and take full responsibility 
for criminal investigations. Supporters argue this could transform the weaknesses of 
the existing prosecution system, while centralising criminal intelligence and case-
tracking. Critics say that given the history of dangerous factionalism within the PNTL, 
it does not make sense to set up another armed security force at this stage in the 
country’s development. It likely would run into similar problems regarding political 
control as those faced by the courts.118 It would also recruit from a very small pool of 
candidates.  
Lobato pushed ahead with the plans despite broad opposition, particularly from 
the police. The minister tried to create the new body by a decree-law, requiring only 
Council of Ministers approval.119 However an armed PIC with broader powers of 
search and seizure would likely be considered as fundamentally affecting citizens’ 
freedoms, so would normally be thought to require full parliamentary review and ap-
proval.120 Ramos-Horta refused to promulgate the legislation, saying the issue should 
be left for the next government, as the AMP’s mandate was coming to a close.121  
 
 
115 For example, UNMIT recorded 47 cases of alleged ill-treatment or excessive use of force by the 
police and thirteen by the military, 7 January to 20 September 2012. “Report of the Secretary-
General”, op. cit., 15 October 2012, para. 37.  
116 “Report of the Secretary-General”, 18 January 2012, op. cit., para. 31. “Oknum F-FDTL oho ferik 
ida, PN konsidera grave” [“F-FDTL kills elderly woman, Parliament considers it a serious case”], 
Suara Timor Lorosa’e, 17 May 2011.  
117 The PIC is sometimes referred to as a Polícia Judiciária (PJ, judiciary police). 
118 The most comprehensive recent assessment of the justice sector found that “the current situa-
tion in Timor-Leste as it relates to judicial independence is problematic. Although the country’s 
judges have consistently asserted their independence … the institutional independence of the ju-
diciary is still not fully recognised by other state actors”. “The Justice System of Timor-Leste: An 
Independent Comprehensive Needs Assessment”, independent expert report commissioned by 
UNMIT, 13 October 2009, p. 16. 
119 This was approved in December 2010. “Meeting of the Council of Ministers of 1 December 
2010”, Secretary of State for the Council of Ministers, press release. A decree-law is not submitted 
for parliamentary approval but if a fifth of parliamentarians call for its appraisal within 30 days of 
publication, parliament may enact changes or terminate its application. See Article 98 of the consti-
tution. 
120 Early drafts of the decree-law to create the judicial police proposed far higher salaries than those 
of the regular police, special weapons and broader search, seizure and arrest powers. “Organic Law 
of the Criminal Investigation Police of Timor-Leste”, justice ministry unnumbered draft. 
121 Crisis Group interviews, senior police officers and international advisers, Dili, December 2011. 
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Undeterred, Lobato published an order authorising recruitment of 40 trainees, 
including twenty serving police, for legal training in Portugal.122 The idea was that if 
a separate institution was never set up, the trainees could be incorporated into the 
PNTL’s regular investigation function. General Commander Longuinhos Monteiro, 
said to oppose a proposal that would remove a large part of the police’s area of opera-
tions and give broader powers and larger salaries to a new force, told serving officers 
that if they went to the year-long training, they could not return.123 
The status of the PIC remains unclear, even as a new headquarters is planned, 
and the 40 investigators have returned from the training in Portugal. The new jus-
tice minister, Dionisio Babo, said only that it is “a political decision”, and there is as 
yet no agreement on whether the service would best be within the PNTL or, if sepa-
rate, should report directly to the justice minister or the prosecutor-general.124 What 
is clear is that any new police service will not be born into an environment propi-
tious to information sharing and realising efficiencies. A senior police commander 
suggested how PNTL colleagues likely would respond to a request for assistance 
from the new force by leaning back in his chair, saying, “you’ve got the fancy weap-
ons, why not go do it yourself?”125  
 
 
122 See “Sobre o Recrutamento e Formação Para a Carreira de Investigação Criminal” [“Regarding 
the recruitment and training of criminal investigators”], Government Resolution 6/2011, 16 Febru-
ary 2011. 
123 Crisis Group interview, senior police commander, December 2011. 
124 Crisis Group interview, Justice Minister Dionisio Babo Soares, Dili, 20 November 2012. 
125 Crisis Group interview, senior police commander, Dili, 6 December 2011. 
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IV. Beyond the Security Sector 
The health of Timor-Leste’s economy is likely to be a far greater constraint on stabil-
ity and prosperity than the state of its security sector. Here it may be in serious trou-
ble. While petroleum revenues have brought an impressive stream of income since 
2004, proven reserves may last only a little over a decade. The government is ex-
panding its spending commitments, as the youthful and ballooning workforce faces 
very limited employment opportunities. It believes the spending will provide both 
the prerequisite infrastructure base and the fiscal stimulus for further growth. This 
would be a risky strategy in any case, but the return on infrastructure investments 
has been so weak to date that the largest impact of the spending risks being contin-
ued high inflation. 
A. State Finances 
Development prospects should be well served by the Petroleum Fund, which has 
now grown to more than $11.7 billion and provides financial independence afforded 
few other fragile states.126 Until a series of concessional loans was agreed in 2012, it 
had zero external debt, another rare asset for a small, essentially poor country.127 
The government has come under criticism from civil society for signing these loans 
and for an increase in withdrawals from the Petroleum Fund in recent years, but 
Timor-Leste still stands out among resource-rich fragile states for its relative fiscal 
restraint. Nevertheless, the government’s record must be viewed in the context of a 
very challenging operating environment.  
Chief among the economic constraints is the dependence on oil and gas, which 
produce 95 per cent of Timor-Leste’s revenue, making it second only to newly inde-
pendent South Sudan in such dependence. The balance of the state’s income is de-
rived from coffee exports and taxes on a small services sector. In recent years, coffee 
has accounted for 85-90 per cent of exports, though just 2 per cent of non-oil and 
gas GDP.128 Government spending drives most economic activity. 
The abundant oil and gas revenues have masked the seriousness of the develop-
ment challenges. Recent gains in the human development index and other indicators 
have come almost exclusively from an increase in gross national income brought by 
the rise in oil and gas revenues. The petroleum sector economy masks weaknesses 
across a range of socio-economic indicators, in large part because of the discrepancy 
between national income and national product. The non-oil and gas economy is 
growing at around 10 per cent annually but is still very small.129 
This dependence is of greater concern when viewed against the uncertainty of how 
long petroleum reserves in the Timor Sea will last. Revenue from the Bayu-Undan 
field, which was developed jointly with Australia and began pumping oil in 2004, 
peaked in 2011 and is expected to run dry as early as 2025. There are an estimated 
 
 
126 At the end of 2012, the Petroleum Fund totaled $11.78 billion. See “Petroleum Fund Quarterly 
Report: Quarter ended 31 December 2012”, Central Bank of Timor-Leste. 
127 Loan agreements were signed in 2012 with the Asian Development Bank and the Japanese 
International Cooperation Agency to help finance road development projects. See “Timor-Leste is 
going into debt”, La’o Hamutuk, 9 May 2012. 
128 Data taken from “Staff Report for the 2011 Article IV Consultation”, IMF, 13 January 2012; See 
Statistical Tables 2 and 4. 
129 Ibid. Growth in non-oil and gas GDP peaked at 14.6 per cent in 2008 according to IMF figures 
but is projected to hover around 10 per cent in coming years. 
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fifteen years of reserves to be extracted from the Greater Sunrise liquid natural gas 
(LNG) field, but its development is frozen amid a dispute over where the gas should 
be processed.130 Other fields may be discovered; the government notes that only 50 
per cent of offshore resources have been explored and that onshore reserves may 
also be promising.131 
Other resource revenue sources are possible, foremost among them mining, 
though this has in effect been banned in the absence of a regulatory regime. Mineral 
deposits are still being surveyed but are expected to be as least as promising as those 
of the island’s western (Indonesian) half, where there has been a manganese boom.  
In light of the challenges, the government’s fiscal expansion looks increasingly 
reckless. Execution rates are highest for cash transfers and handouts; the rapid growth 
of staff and wages make the civil service look like a de facto government employment 
scheme. Along with an ever higher bill of recurrent spending commitments, this is 
creating high public expectations regarding state largesse.  
The working-age population is growing by more than 15,000 a year, a rate that 
will increase as babies born during a post-1999 peak in birth rates come of age.132 
While birth rates have fallen since independence, a 2010 health and living standards 
survey still reported nearly six births per woman.133 This emerging workforce is 
poorly educated and lacks key skills. The government has established a Human 
Capital Development Fund, but given the poor quality of primary and secondary 
schools, it is unlikely to be effective if not paired with at least an equivalent focus on 
improving basic education.  
B. The Government’s Plan 
The government’s guiding vision was laid out in a Strategic Development Plan issued 
in 2011. As it was being developed in 2010, the prime minister described it as a “Bible” 
for the construction of the state.134 It lays out an ambitious level of state investment 
aimed at stimulating domestic economic activity and luring foreign investment. 
Heavily reliant on further resource revenues to fund projects, the plan appears in 
part a negotiating tactic in the Greater Sunrise impasse (described below), on the ulti-
mate resolution of which it is highly dependent.  
 
 
130 See “Timor-Leste’s Annual Petroleum Reserves”, La’o Hamutuk, December 2011, at www.lao 
hamutuk.org/econ/OGE12/OilRevenuesTotalDec2011En900.gif. 
131 “Correction of inconsistencies in international media regarding oil and gas”, government press 
release, 21 March 2013. In April 2013, the government announced its national oil company, TIMOR 
GAP, had entered into joint exploration activity with two commercial partners, Eni and Inpex. 
“Timor-Leste’s national oil company commences its first exploration activity”, government press 
release, 22 April 2013. 
132 The NGO La’o Hamutuk has estimated that the number of young people entering the workforce 
in 2024, just as the Bayu-Udan and Kitan fields are anticipated to run dry, will be double what it is 
today. “Submission to Committees C and D”, 16 January 2013, available at www.laohamutuk. 
org/econ/OGE13/LHSubCom18Jan2013en.pdf. 
133 “Timor-Leste Health and Demographic Survey 2009-2010”, op. cit. 
134 “Planu Estratéjiku Dezenvolvimentu Nasional (PEDN) hanesan Bíblia ba Konstrusaun Estadu” 
[“National Development Strategy Plan (PEDN) is like a Bible for the construction of the State”], 
government press release, 28 April 2010. 
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1. The Strategic Development Plan 
The plan sets out a vision for development to 2030. Gusmão led the drafting, seques-
tering himself for nearly three months in 2010 to help prepare the 500-page first 
draft. He then toured the country’s 65 sub-districts over five months, delivering full-
day presentations to communities. A far slimmer version of the plan presented to 
parliament in July 2011135 reflected great confidence in continued growth of the econ-
omy: it assumes sustained annual GDP growth of more than 10 per cent and proclaims 
the ambitious goal of upper-middle-income status for Timor-Leste by 2030.136 
Its focus is the upgrading of infrastructure nationwide and establishment of a 
south coast petroleum industry corridor. This would include a planned supply base 
for the petroleum industry in the town of Suai, a petrochemicals refinery in Betano 
and an LNG processing plant in Beaçu, where it is hoped that a pipeline will be built 
to process gas from the Greater Sunrise fields.137 All are to be linked by a toll road 
the cost of which an NGO estimated at $1.7 billion.138 
2. Impasse over Greater Sunrise 
No development plan has yet been agreed for producing gas from the Greater Sun-
rise fields. Discussions over development there and throughout the Timor Sea have 
been complicated by the lack of an agreed maritime boundary with Australia. Three 
bilateral treaties have established a framework for ownership and revenue sharing of 
oil and gas fields in the area of the Timor Sea known as the “Timor Gap”. Rather 
than make progress toward agreement on a boundary, however, these treaties have 
instead deferred the discussion. 
The “Timor Gap” emerged after a 1972 treaty between Indonesia and Australia on 
maritime boundaries excluded the roughly 150-mile stretch south of the eastern half 
of the island then administered as Portuguese Timor.139 Portugal did not agree to the 
method used to determine the boundary, which falls well north of the median line 
between Timor-Leste and Australia; the undemarcated area became known as the 
Timor “Gap”. In 1979, Australia began ten years of negotiations with Jakarta that 
produced a treaty on joint exploration for and revenue sharing from petroleum in 
the Timor Sea, including in water off what had become Indonesia-occupied East 
Timor. The deal opened the way to exploration of the fields but constituted Australian 
de jure recognition of Indonesian administration of East Timor.140  
 
 
135 The plan is available on the government website at timor-leste.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2012/ 
02/Strategic-Development-Plan_EN.pdf. 
136 This would put Timor-Leste in the category currently occupied by such countries as China, Thai-
land, Russia and South Africa that have gross national incomes between $4,036 and $12,475 per 
capita. Gross national income includes petroleum revenues; if they start to fall as forecast in the 
next decade, it will be even harder to meet this goal. For a study that examined the inputs needed to 
achieve such growth, see “Economic Growth to 2030 in Timor-Leste”, Asian Development Bank, 
August 2011. 
137 For more on the south coast development plan, see “South Coast Petroleum Infrastructure Pro-
ject”, www.laohamutuk.org/Oil/TasiMane/11TasiMane.htm. 
138 A study commissioned by the government in 2011 estimated a total cost of $1.39 billion. “High-
way dreams – and their costs”, La’o Hamutuk, 20 October 2011, at laohamutuk.blogspot.com/2011/ 
10/highway-dreams-and-their-costs.html. 
139 Australia-Indonesia “Agreement… Establishing Certain Seabed Boundaries in the Area of the 
Timor and Arafura Seas”, 18 May 1971, www.etan.org/et2003/march/01/07offsho.htm. 
140 Australia-Indonesia Timor Gap “Treaty… on the Zone of Cooperation in an Area between the 
Indonesian Province of East Timor and the Northern Australia”, 11 December 1989. 
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In advance of Timor-Leste’s May 2002 independence, negotiations began on a 
new bilateral arrangement, but they deferred determination of a maritime boundary. 
Instead, the 2002 Timor Sea Treaty established the Joint Petroleum Development 
Area (JPDA), in the same area that had been agreed under the Timor Gap Treaty. 
The two countries jointly manage exploration and production of petroleum resources 
inside the area. Timor-Leste receives 90 per cent of upstream revenues, Australia 10 
per cent. A further agreement signed in 2003 set a single framework for develop-
ment of the Greater Sunrise field, which straddles the boundary between the JPDA 
and waters claimed by Australia. It granted 18.1 per cent of revenues to Timor-Leste.141 
In 2006, the two governments signed the Treaty on Certain Maritime Arrange-
ments in the Timor Sea (CMATS), which increased Timor-Leste’s share in Sunrise 
upstream revenues to half but also committed it to recognising full Australian owner-
ship of two key areas to the west and east of the JPDA.142 It also suspended maritime 
boundary negotiations for 50 years. 
There has been no subsequent agreement on a development plan for Greater Sun-
rise. The treaties stipulate that the lead operator of the Sunrise development (Wood-
side Petroleum) must submit a development plan for approval by the authorities of 
both countries. In April 2010, Woodside announced its preference for a floating pro-
cessing facility, claiming that the option preferred by Dili – a pipeline from Sunrise 
to an onshore processing facility – was both too costly and too risky.143 The Timorese 
immediately made it clear they would not accept the plan and criticised the compa-
ny’s “arrogance”; they have argued that Woodside did not seriously examine the 
pipeline option.144 The disagreement has also complicated bilateral relations with 
Australia.145 What is clear is that Woodside and its partners failed to recognise the 
Timorese government as a partner from the outset and have since struggled to regain 
an effective working relationship. 
Dili now says it is considering terminating CMATS, an option that became availa-
ble on 23 February 2013, the treaty’s sixth anniversary.146 Abandoning CMATS would 
change little in the framework for developing Sunrise. It provides that even if a party 
 
 
141 This revenue share corresponds to 90 per cent of the 20.1 per cent of the Sunrise area inside the 
JPDA. While the agreement was signed by the governments in 2003, the Timorese parliament de-
clined to ratify it until 2007. “Agreement… relating to the Unitisation of the Sunrise and Trouba-
dour Fields”, signed 6 March 2003, entered into force 23 February 2007. 
142 Australia-Timor-Leste “Treaty… on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea”, signed 12 
January 2006, entered into force 23 February 2007. 
143 “Sunrise Joint Venture selects floating processing option”, 29 April 2010, at www.woodside. 
com.au/Investors-Mdia/Announcements/Documents/29.04.2010%20Sunrise% 20Joint%20Venture 
%20Selects%20Floating%20Processing%20Option.pdf. 
144 “Statement by the Spokesperson of the IV Constitutional Government on 29 April 2010”, timor-
leste.gov. 
145 Canberra has argued that a decision by the operators on the pipeline is a purely commercial 
matter; Dili has sometimes pushed the Australian government to intervene in favour of a pipeline to 
the Timorese coast. “East Timor urges action on Sunrise”, Australian Financial Review, 22 October 
2012.  
146 Article 12 of the CMATS Treaty stipulates that either party may give notice of intention to termi-
nate if no development plan has been agreed within six years, or production does not begin within 
ten years (23 February 2017). Petroleum and Natural Resources Minister Alfredo Pires told a press 
agency that “[w]e are looking at all the possibilities, pros and cons, but there is the possibility of 
some changes. The government is currently engaged in conversations with Australia and we are 
having pretty interesting conversations” (Crisis Group translation). “Timor-Leste negoceia com 
Austrália modificações no tratado sobre Mar de Timor”, Lusa, 15 February 2013.  
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walks away, most of the key provisions relating to Sunrise (including 50-50 revenue 
sharing) return to force once any production begins. 
What would change following termination of CMATS would be ability to negoti-
ate the maritime boundary. This would open up discussions over fields outside the 
JPDA, including Corrallina-Laminaria, where production of oil began in 1999 and 
whose tax revenues accrue exclusively to Australia. Buoyed by recent political stabil-
ity and its petroleum revenues, Dili may feel it is in a stronger negotiating position 
than previously; at least compared with 2006, it can better afford to defer revenues 
while it waits for a more advantageous deal. 
C. Broader Policy Engagement 
The new administration wants to shift policy in two major areas, by introducing a 
comprehensive land titling and land tenure administration system and decentralis-
ing government, hoping the latter initiative might mitigate wealth inequality and 
smooth the impact of future spending. Both initiatives were planned by earlier gov-
ernments, have proven difficult, but will only grow more important.  
Unlike in some other fragile states, the Timorese state and its institutions gener-
ally enjoy a high degree of legitimacy; even those who fought for integration with In-
donesia now say they fully recognise this. The new administration also faces fewer 
challenges to its tenure than its predecessor, which the opposition party Fretilin 
often referred to as a “de facto government”. What is less assured is the legitimacy of 
government policy. 
1. Land laws 
Finding a regulatory solution to overlapping histories of colonial land administration 
has been a decade-long effort.147 A package of three laws on tenure, expropriation 
and compensation was debated by the previous parliament in February 2012.148 Few 
legislators seemed to fully grasp their complex technical impact, but the house ap-
proved the laws with a few small amendments. Outgoing President José Ramos-Horta 
vetoed them in March, responding in part to civil society pressure.149 Expecting 
delays in approval of the package, the AMP government had already promulgated a 
decree-law in July 2011 that enables titles to be issued for undisputed parcels.150 The 
full package would provide means for settling conflicting claims and establishing a 
basis for expropriation, as well as a compensation fund for some cases. 
A slightly revised version of the three laws is now being prepared for submission 
to parliament.151 A few key changes have been made to satisfy critics: these focus pri-
 
 
147 Crisis Group explored the subject in depth in its Briefing, Managing Land Conflict in Timor-
Leste, op. cit. For a comprehensive review of the subject, see Daniel Fitzpatrick, Andrew McWilliam 
and Susana Barnes, Property and Social Resilience in Times of Conflict: Land Custom and Law in 
East Timor (Farnham, 2013). 
148 These laws are referred to as the Regime Especial para a Definição da Titularidade de Bens 
Imóveis [Special Regime for the Definition of Property Ownership], also known as the Lei de Terras 
[Land Law], Lei do Fundo Financeiro Immobiliário [Special Real Estate Fund Law] and the Lei de 
Expropriações [Expropriations Law]. 
149 The texts of these letters are at www.laohamutuk.org/Agri/land/2012/12PNpassPRveto.htm. 
150 “Regularização da Titularidade de Bens Imóveis em Casos Não Disputados” [“Regularisation of 
ownership of immovable property in undispuated cases”], Decree-Law no. 27/2011, 6 July 2011. 
151 Crisis Group interview, Justice Minister Dionisio Babo Soares, Dili, 20 November 2012. A num-
ber of changes were made to conform the law with the 2011 Civil Code. 
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marily on concerns that the laws offered insufficient protection to those evicted from 
their property; the need for greater protection of some customary rights associated 
with land use; and the lack of clarity surrounding valuation for the purpose of com-
pensation.152 Remaining controversial provisions include a limit on ownership rights 
of the many who moved into properties (particularly in Dili) abandoned during the 
1999 chaos153 and a bar on foreign nationals holding even secondary property rights.154 
Wide consensus on such a complex topic is unlikely, particularly given the extent 
to which any property regime is certain to create winners and losers. A broad basic 
understanding of the legislation should be the priority. Much of the potential for 
conflict over land has built up over a decade of what many described as “waiting for 
the law” – placing disputes on hold until there is a legal mechanism for settlement.155 
There will be greater pressure for resolution once the laws have been passed, even if 
it does not meet the expectations of some (particularly in rural communities). The 
laws are also likely to carry new potential for conflict, as tenure questions take on 
greater financial implications. The package leaves the question of community land to 
further research. 
As Crisis Group has argued, the laws, even after ten years, are only one step to-
ward improved land management.156 There remain serious questions regarding the 
capacity of the land and property directorate to administer them effectively, particu-
larly since the initiation of full titling will place a heavy burden on its thin staff. Pres-
sure will grow with the planned south coast development and the possibility of open-
ing up tracts for mining exploration. A transparent government-wide policy on what 
compensation will be paid to those forced to relocate should be a top priority: none 
exists, and in recent years the process and size of payments has often been left to the 
company developing property. 
2. Decentralisation  
The government has also revived the decentralisation agenda that was put on hold in 
2010 amid disagreements over the structure of local government and the difficulties 
of organising another round of elections. During this parliamentary term, it intends 
to create between three and five new municipalities, using existing districts as a geo-
graphical basis but devolving greater control to a municipal assembly and admin-
 
 
152 The ministry has provided a review of these changes and their rationale in documents on its 
website, at www.mj.gov.tl/?q=node/338. 
153 The law limits the potential acquisition of property by adverse possession (usucapião) to those 
claimants peacefully occupying property before 31 December 1998. A first draft used a date of 31 
December 1999. 
154 This is particularly important with regard to the significant number of Indonesian and Portu-
guese citizens with property claims based on previous rights. An explanatory note on the law issued 
by the justice ministry warned this provision could become the subject of litigation by foreign na-
tionals holding Portuguese or Indonesian-era property rights. See “Regime Especial para a Defini-
ção da Titularidade de Bens Imóveis – Relatório de alterações” [“Special regime for the determina-
tion of ownership of immovable property – review of changes”], Government of Timor-Leste, 12 
November 2012, p. 17, www.mj.gov.tl/?q=node/338. 
155 Two of the leading authors on land administration issues in Timor-Leste used this as a title for 
an article in 2005. Daniel Fitzpatrick and Andrew McWilliam, “Waiting for law: Land custom and 
legal regulation in Timor-Leste”, Development Bulletin 68, pp. 58–61. 
156 Crisis Group Briefing, Managing Land Conflict in Timor-Leste, op. cit. 
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istration.157 Under existing plans, voters would directly elect a municipal assembly, 
likely beginning in 2015, but the final contours of the policy remain under debate.158 
Several factors support a push for decentralisation. Foremost is the hope that de-
volution would do something to address the slow pace of development outside the 
capital. District-level decisions on PDD projects (see Section I above) have always 
been viewed as a precursor to fuller decentralisation. There is also strong pressure 
following the 2012 parliamentary elections, during which some parties promised 
that the policy would reward their supporters with patronage.159  
Decentralisation will create jobs through increased allocation of resources at mu-
nicipal level, the creation of salaried municipal assemblies and the channelling of 
more funds through the municipalities for local contracting. The initiative appears in 
the government’s five-year plan under the framework of employment generation.160 
Earlier drafts on decentralisation have called for party-based municipal elections. In 
view of the geographical distinctions in party support (see above), this could lead to 
the emergence of the kind of regional-dominated politics that Timor-Leste’s national-
list system was nominally designed to avoid. 
Whether this would bring improved services is far less certain. As the amount of 
money administered at their level has expanded in recent years, districts have strug-
gled with oversight and quality control.161 A district administrator explained that 
audit controls over projects executed under the PDD program were in place, but that 
auditors lacked the expertise to give good evaluations: district-level staff might declare 
an irrigation canal a success, only to see it collapse in the first big rains.162 National 
ministries have struggled to recruit skilled staff and increase efficiency, so it is diffi-
cult to know what gains will be made by developing up to thirteen new municipal 
administrations. 
Though existing district administrations have minimal control over service deliv-
ery, a building spree in recent years has led to new district administration buildings 
in many areas and establishment of district offices for many national-level services, 
such as the prosecution service, the public defender and the land and property direc-
torate. An administrator said he had three full-time staff, each with the title “head of 
section”, but none had any subordinates to manage.163 
D. Unemployment and Social Inequality 
The two most dangerous potential triggers for conflict as the population expands are 
youth unemployment and social inequality. The former has been acknowledged as a 
growing challenge, but there has been little frank assessment of its extent, and even 
 
 
157 “Programa do V Governo Constitucional, Legislatura 2012-2017” [“Program of the Fifth Consti-
tutional Government”], Presidency of the Council of Ministers, 26 August 2012. 
158 The prime minister began a nationwide campaign in April 2013 to explain the benefits of the 
planned decentralisation program. 
159 Crisis Group interview, political analyst, Dili, 4 September 2012.  
160 “Programa do V Governo Constitucional”, op. cit. 
161 In comments to the press recently, the public works state secretary estimated that 60 per cent of 
infrastructure projects are poor quality. “Projeitu 60% laiha kualidade” [“60 per cent of projects are 
poor quality”], Timor Post, 22 April 2013. 
162 Crisis Group interview, Viqueque district administrator, Viqueque, 23 May 2012. 
163 Crisis Group interview, Bobonaro district administrator, Maliana, 6 September 2012. 
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mitigating policies are not yet clear. Despite a recent decline, Timor-Leste’s birth 
rate remains Asia’s highest: 5.7 per woman.164  
As SUVs increase on Dili’s congested streets and the number of luxury homes 
creeps upwards, so will the potential for social inequality to trigger instability. Relia-
ble data on income inequality does not exist, but 71 per cent of the available work-
force is either unemployed or informally employed. At the same time, a relatively 
wealthy middle class is emerging. A 2009-2010 demographic survey showed the 
geographic disparities: in Dili, 91 per cent of the population in the top two income 
quintiles; in rural areas, 28 per cent.165 
Public service jobs carry a lot of benefits. Monthly salaries are relatively high – 
from $2,500 for secretaries of state and parliamentarians to $4,500 for ministers – 
but the fringe benefits are even greater.166 Following retirement, parliamentarians 
and ministers can draw their full salaries for life. For cabinet members or above, this 
includes full health benefits (including treatment in Singapore) paid by the govern-
ment.167 Parliamentarians have pledged several times to review the benefits so as to 
make it less costly, but there have been no changes. The government may be begin-
ning to invest money with the goal of inclusive growth, but the will to restrict elite 
largesse appears to be absent. 
E. Corruption Allegations: A Threat to Legitimacy 
There is a perception of high levels of corruption.168 If left unaddressed, it risks chal-
lenging the legitimacy of government. Tackling corruption has proven a challenge 
for the judiciary, even as public attention on the issue has blossomed. A proliferation 
of forums for addressing the issue, including the office of the Provedor [Ombuds-
man] and the post of vice prime minister for state administration (established in 
2009), has proven ineffective. The vice prime minister position was in effect abol-
ished after the incumbent, Mário Carrascalão, resigned in September 2010, citing 
“rampant” corruption in the government, an allegation the government rejected as 
“unfounded” in a detailed public statement.169 
 
 
164 “Timor-Leste Health and Demographic Survey 2009-2010”, op. cit.  
165 Ibid. 
166 Most civil service positions carry a maximum monthly salary of $850 (for directors general), but 
specialist positions pay more. A range of advisory positions recruited from outside the civil service 
pay far more. 
167 The terms of this pensão vitalícia for former office-holders are laid out in a law passed at the 
end of the first parliament’s tenure. “Estatuto dos Titulares dos Orgãos de Soberania” [“Statute of 
the office holders of the Organs of Sovereignty”], Law 7/2007, 22 July 2007. In 2011, the value of 
associated benefits, except health, was capped at $180,000 per year per ex-office holder, “Quarta 
alteração ao Decreto do Governo no. 2/2007” [“Fourth change to Government Decree no. 2/2007”], 
Decree 12/2011, 7 December 2011. 
168 A survey commissioned by the Timorese Anti-Corruption Commission reported that 57 per cent 
of respondents viewed corruption as a serious or very serious problem; 55 per cent believed it was 
increasing but also that the government had a sincere interest in combating it. There were no previ-
ous surveys, so trends were not evident. “Corruption Perception Survey 2011”, 2011. In the annual 
scorecard published by the Millennium Challenge Corporation, Timor-Leste’s score under the “con-
trol of corruption” indicator has fallen slightly in recent years.  
169 “E. Timor deputy PM resigns over corruption”, Agence France-Presse, 8 September 2010; and 
“Statement regarding the office of the vice prime minister Mario Carrascalao”, media release, Secre-
tary of State for the Council of Ministers and Official Spokesperson for the Government of Timor-
Leste Ágio Pereira, 2 September 2010. 
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Creation in 2010 of an Anti-Corruption Commission (Commissão Anti-Corrup-
ção, CAC) gave the judiciary a broader set of investigative tools.170 By mid-2012, the 
CAC had initiated investigations into 34 suspects in 28 cases, and handed twelve 
cases over to the prosecutor-general for follow-up.171 
The only two convictions on corruption-related charges emerged from investiga-
tions that pre-date the CAC. They are the August 2011 conviction of former Dili dis-
trict administrator Ruben Braz de Carvalho and the June 2012 conviction of former 
Justice Minister Lúcia Lobato. De Carvalho’s case related to the alleged embezzle-
ment of $21,800 in state finances in 2002, but he has filed an appeal and remains at 
liberty pending its disposition.172 A second case against him, related to alleged falsi-
fication of documents in the 2010 Dili PDD process, is reportedly now before the Dili 
District Court.173 
Lobato was found guilty on one of the charges against her in connection with a 
procurement process, though was found not guilty on others. The appeals court up-
held the conviction in December 2012, and she began serving a five-year sentence 
the next month.174 The case remains controversial. On 15 April 2013, her lawyers 
alleged in a press conference that its treatment in the appeals court – which also 
rejected a habeas corpus filing in January – was marked by lack of impartiality and 
political interference.175 More developments are likely.  
It is unclear whether there is a broader political commitment to ending corrup-
tion. With the approach of the 2012 elections, Gusmão distanced himself personally 
from the issue, giving little response to emerging rumours and allegations other than 
to suggest that individual AMP cabinet members should be investigated.176 Several of 
those ministers were re-appointed in the new government. Nonetheless, the number 
of cases reaching formal investigation or prosecution has increased. Allegations con-
cerning the former tourism and culture minister,177 the education minister,178 and 
 
 
170 A law setting up the CAC was passed in April 2009, but it only began operations following the 
swearing in of Commissioner Adérito de Jesus Soares on 22 February 2010, after a lengthy and dif-
ficult search for a consensus candidate.  
171 See Samuel de Jaegere, “Principles for Anti-Corruption Agencies: A Game Changer”, Jindal 
Journal of Public Policy, vol. 1, issue 1, August 2012. 
172 “Timor-Leste: Presidente do distrito de Díli recorre da decisão do tribunal” [“Timor-Leste: Dili 
district administrator appeals court decision”], Portuguese News Network, 23 August 2011. 
173 “TDD seidauk finaliza prosésu kazu Ruben Braz” [“Dili District Court has not yet ended trial in 
case of Ruben Braz”], Jornal Independente, 8 January 2013. 
174 João Manuel Rocha, “Ex-ministra da Justiça de Timor-Leste começou a cumprir cinco anos de 
prisão” [“Former Timor-Leste justice minister begins serving five-year prison term”], Público, 23 
January 2013. 
175 “Advogado Lúcia Lobato halo akuzasaun sériu ba mal-komportamentu hasoru juis sira iha Tri-
bunal Rekursu” [“Lúcia Lobato’s lawyers issue serious accusation of misconduct against Appeals 
Court judges”], Judicial System Monitoring Program, press release, 22 April 2013. 
176 “Xanana Kontinua Husu KAK Atu Halo Auditoria ba Membru Governu” [“Xanana repeats re-
quest to Anti-Corruption Commission to audit cabinet members”], CJITL, 11 August 2011. CNRT 
Secretary General Dionísio Babo also explained the party did not fear that backlash from corruption 
allegations would hurt it with voters, because “[t]he people generally know that CNRT has no min-
ister in this government; it only has secretaries of state and one vice-minister”. “Partido de Xanana 
imune à corrupção, garante secretário-geral”, Lusa, 3 June 2012. 
177 “TDD absolve kazu ASDT, MP sei hatama rekursu” [“Dili District Court acquits in case of ASDT, 
prosecutor will appeal”], Suara Timor Lorosae, 21 March 2013. 
178 “KAK aplika TIR ba eis-ministru Cancio” [“Anti-Corruption Commission applies TIR to ex-
minister Cancio”], Jornal Independente, 25 February 2013. 
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the finance minister179 have all received attention, though not without controversy. 
For a country with such a young prosecution service, so much activity should be 
viewed as an important achievement, as well as a testament to the CAC’s intention to 
use its powers. 
Tools have been introduced that could be used to promote greater accountability 
in spending. These include transparency websites that provide information on what 
has been budgeted and what contracts have been awarded and to whom.180 But these 
portals do not appear to be reliably updated, and some key information is frequently 
missing. When the data is retrievable, there does not seem to be much follow-up.  
 
 
179 “KAK Investiga Ona Kazu Emilia Pires” [“Anti-Corruption Commission is investigating Emilia 
Pires”], Jornal Independente, 19 February 2013. The minister has not commented on the reported 
investigation but has criticised the poor quality of Timorese investigative journalism. See “Finance 
minister ‘trips’ over HNGV beds”, Tempo Semanal (online), 27 February 2013. 
180 These are all online at www.transparency.gov.tl. 
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V. Conclusion 
Timor-Leste appears to have recovered from the 2006 crisis and to have consolidat-
ed its post-independence stability. In the process, the AMP government ignored the 
advice of international experts who suggested sustainable recovery would take a dec-
ade. Following the 2012 elections, the two great poles of politics, Gusmão and Alka-
tiri, have put aside their sometimes acrimonious relationship to work together. In 
line with these positive developments, Crisis Group anticipates maintaining a watch-
ing brief on the young country rather than writing further reports. There are, none-
theless, serious concerns about sustainability that will have to be dealt with over the 
next decade: 
Running out of money. The current government’s development plans are predicat-
ed on the transformative effects of shock investment and a gamble that costly planned 
developments on the south coast will attract investments from the petroleum indus-
try. These are risky assumptions. Untold riches may still lie under the Timor Sea, but 
this is unlikely since exploration has been continuous since the 1970s. Spending all 
the petroleum sector money now, when open reserves could run dry within fifteen 
years, risks wasting much while the domestic absorptive capacity simply is not there. 
A messy political transition. The centralisation of political power around the cur-
rent prime minister, the lack of stable alliances and of substantive platforms among 
most political parties, and the difficulty younger politicians have in emerging as 
credible alternatives to the generation that first declared independence in 1975 are 
all factors that could make a political transition following Gusmão’s exit messy. 
Creating a culture of dependency and incentives for violence.  The AMP govern-
ment and its successor, now in power, have sought to redistribute the wealth of the 
state and to silence disaffected but influential individuals (many of them former 
guerrillas). But giving contracts to unskilled combatants and troublemakers is not a 
good way to drive development. Paired with the impunity that followed the political 
violence of the 2006 crisis, there appear to be strong perverse incentives to foment 
unrest. 
Failing to develop a well-functioning justice sector.  The lack of a responsive justice 
sector has the potential to make any future economic downturn more incendiary. 
Weak investigations and weak prosecutions, paired with the effect of an effort to sweep 
violence between 1974 and 2008 under the rug, risk fuelling further resentment and 
social jealousy. Justice sector improvements are not purely an issue of resources; 
they also require far greater political will to reinforce a culture of rule of law. 
Sliding towards authoritarianism.  Timor-Leste is principally viewed as a post-
conflict state, but it is sometimes overlooked that it is also a post-authoritarian state. 
Just as it emerged from the administration of the Portuguese dictatorship that was 
toppled by popular protests in Lisbon in 1974, it came under the administration of 
the Indonesian Orde Baru (New Order) state. An influential part of the current lead-
ership has also been steeped in the anti-democratic experience of guerrilla warfare. 
The political culture and the security forces have not always kept pace with the re-
forms of the past thirteen years. Particularly if the government is unable to deliver 
greater development gains in the coming years, a weak state and security forces whose 
default approach is coercion could support a move toward a state with fewer demo-
cratic freedoms. 
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Following the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers in December 2012, the government is 
less interested in pursuing difficult reforms than in transforming the image of a 
country known for too long as a place of violence. The optics of government policy 
are as much (if not more) a concern of fragile states as they are of wealthier states 
with fewer immediate challenges. But the government urgently needs to examine the 
costs of its approach to shoring up stability and fostering development. It may find 
the medium-term risks unaffordable.  
Dili/Jakarta/Brussels, 8 May 2013 
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